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Continuity and change in national parties’ strategies 
of adaptation to European integration
Introduction
How have national parties adapted their strategies of 
competition and behaviour to use, handle, and man-
age the European issue in domestic political competi-
tion? How have different parties within distinct political 
systems adapted their behaviour under the influence of 
European integration over time? In response to these re-
search questions, this article provides a critical review of 
the existing studies and of their arguments in the con-
temporary political science literature. Building on a com-
prehensive review of the existing findings, it attemps to 
outline the key elements of continuity and change in 
the ways national party organisations have strategically 
adapted to the increasing significance of European in-
tegration in West European party systems over the last 
twenty years. This comparative and longitudinal outlook 
enables us to engage in a broader theoretical debate 
and it paves the way to future investigations. 
 The article is structured into three complementary sec-
tions that discuss the findings related to the three main 
dimensions of studies in the literature: while the first sec-
tion reflects upon the strategies of political communica-
tion of national parties over EU matters; the second reas-
sesses the dilemmas they have faced in EU referendums, 
their main strategies for managing intra-party factional-
ism as well as their evolving behaviour in response to the 
consolidation of the European electoral arena. The final 
section introduces a broader normative debate on the 
effects of these strategies of politicisation and depolitici-
sation of EU matters, outlining the centrality of a twofold 
paradox of “distance” and “defiance”.
The strategies of communication over 
Europe of domestic party organisations: 
The stability of the marginalisation and 
the nationalisation of the EU
The literature dealing with political communication on 
EU matters at the national level is dominated by what 
could be conceptualised as the “europeanisation argu-
ment”, that is to say, the broad idea that the visibility of 
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Abstract
How have national parties adapted their strategies of competition and behaviour to use, handle, and manage the European issue in do-
mestic political competition? This article outlines the principal elements of continuity and change in the ways national party organisations 
have strategically adapted to the increasing significance of European integration in West European party systems over the last twenty years. 
It contests the arguments of a gradual europeanisation and rising progress of euroscepticism. It shows that the likelihood of politicisation 
over European matters occurring has been very dependent on the arena and the context considered. Few changes have occurred regarding 
the consensual and relatively positive treatment of the European Union (EU) in national newspapers, the very limited saliency of EU-related 
debates in national electoral campaigns and the tendency of mainstream parties to converge rather than diverge on the ways they frame 
the EU. Conflicts over EU matters are not typical, nor are they inherently on the increase: they remain the exception rather than the rule.
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European affairs has gradually increased over the last 
fifteen or twenty years, while EU-related issues would 
have witnessed more and more convergent frames 
across distinct EU members states through transnation-
alisation trends. It is spoken here of a “europeanisation 
argument” because it introduces the notions of gradual 
and convergent processes that would have increasing-
ly fostered the representation of European actors (verti-
cal europeanisation), and of other actors from distinct 
EU member states (horizontal europeanisation) in do-
mestic political debates. European actors or members 
of EU institutions would tend to increasingly partici-
pate in EU-related debates at the national level. It is said 
that these debates would witness increasingly similar 
frames of reference and a growing interconnectedness 
across EU countries. However, although the visibility of 
European affairs has, at times, increased at the national 
level - under certain political conjunctures which have 
fostered more intense debates - generally, EU matters 
have nevertheless remained relatively marginal in do-
mestic politics. While this article would agree that con-
vergent frames have sometimes emerged, in contrast, 
under routine circumstances as well as in general elec-
tion campaigns, it is the stability of distinct “nationally-
grounded” ways of framing the EU that has prevailed, 
while transnationalisation trends have remained mar-
ginal.
The stable marginalisation and low 
visibility of European a!airs
The idea that the visibility of EU affairs has increased 
over time in domestic politics over the past twenty 
years is commonplace in the literature (Van de Steeg 
2002: 499-519; Koopmans 2007: 183-210). From an em-
pirical point of view, it has led several authors to take 
for granted the existence of a European public sphere, 
or to “look for” evidence that confirms its gradual emer-
gence. For example, on the basis of the development 
of the symbols of the EU, such as the Euro, and the gen-
eral positive support for EU membership by the popu-
lations of the distinct EU member states, Michael Bruter 
argues that a “mass European identity” would progres-
sively have emerged (Bruter 2005: 2). However, a clear 
normative bias has prevailed. First, as a consequence of 
the fact that the theoretical and conceptual reflections 
have generally dominated the empirical investigations. 
Second, most political scientists have also preferred a 
“top-down” vision of what a European public sphere 
would entail, rather than developing a bottom-up 
approach. Such alternative perspective would have 
started with empirical and inductive observations, to 
later argue, on the basis of concrete evidence, wheth-
er a process of “europeanisation” of domestic public 
spheres could in fact be observed. As Sophie Duchesne 
has rightly argued: “can we consider that an `imaginary 
European´ exists nowadays: controversial, variable from 
one country to another, and sufficiently constructed 
and present to exercise an influence upon the ways Eu-
ropeans negotiate and act in relation to one another, 
and in relation to the rest of the world? It demands to 
be demonstrated” (Duchesne 2010: 7-16). The idea of 
a “gradual europeanisation of public spheres” is in fact 
contradicted by the lack of longitudinal perspectives, 
that are, undoubtedly, crucial to assess whether some-
thing has changed or not. These limits have been at-
tested compellingly by Risse, who strongly defends this 
“europeanisation” thesis, even though he recognises 
that “the picture for the pre-1995 period remains un-
clear” (Risse 2010: 127-128). 
This lack of a longitudinal perspective also appeared 
in the study of Hans-Jörg Trenz who argued, on the 
basis of the study of eleven daily newspapers from six 
EU member states, that one third of all political news 
contained references to EU issues (Trenz 2004: 291-
319). However, as he focused only on one single year 
(in 2000), his findings might only represent a specific 
conjuncture. Elsewhere, he recognised the dilemma 
between of a “normative overstretch” on the one hand, 
and “empirical disenchantment” on the other hand 
(Trenz 2008). The conclusion that EU actors themselves 
are more visible when the specific issue of EU integra-
tion is framed, or that the more competences the EU 
presents in a given issue arena, the more EU actors are 
referred to in the media, is not especially unsurprising. 
(Koopmans 2007: 183-210). A longitudinal perspective 
is not only necessary, but the increasing visibility (or 
not) of EU affairs also needs to be considered on the ba-
sis of the degree to which national actors themselves, 
and not only European actors, have framed (or not) the 
EU to a greater extent. Wessler and his coauthors found 
that the articles mentioning EU actors have steadily in-
creased between 1982 and 2003, but they also pointed 
out that these have remained relatively marginal by 
comparison to national institutions and actors (Wessler 
et al. 2008: 41). 
Yet, if a common pattern can be delineated regard-
ing the nature of EU-related debates at the national 
level, it can be argued that it is the continuously lim-
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ited visibility of EU institutions and actors that needs to 
be emphasised. National party organisations have not 
framed EU issues to a greater extent in domestic elec-
toral campaigns over the last fifteen years. The extent 
to which EU-related issues might potentially constitute 
a matter of partisan debates in domestic campaigns in 
fact remains strongly influenced by contextual factors, 
and especially by their temporal proximity to EU “grand 
bargains” and Treaty negotiations. Indeed, it can be said 
that the closer domestic elections occur to EU Treaty 
ratifications and the more polarised mainstream par-
ties are on EU matters, the more EU-related debates are 
likely to be salient in national electoral campaigns. 
In some ways, there is nothing new in the fact that gen-
eral elections are still, first and foremost, about national 
politics and that the saliency of EU issues in domestic 
campaigns remains very limited. However, the fact that 
we cannot say, on the basis of concrete empirical evi-
dence, that nowadays there are more debates about 
Europe in national electoral campaigns than there were 
in the early 1990s, is far more surprising and presents 
important theoretical implications. Indeed, it is a clear 
indication that national elites have not contributed to 
foster a “cognitive” turn that might have attenuated the 
real and the imaginary boundaries that continue to se-
clude domestic political spaces and national citizens 
from the EU system of governance. Conversely, it would 
appear that whilst the “institutions” of the EU have 
evolved, the main domestic “interests” and nationally-
oriented “ideas” of domestic elites have remained rela-
tively unchanged, so that they have, arguably, become 
“trapped by their ideas” about Europe (Hassenteufel 
and Surel 2001: 8-24; Schmidt 2007a: 992-1009).
In fact, several other studies also question the thesis of a 
gradual europeanisation of domestic partisan debates. 
A recent study using time series data analysis from 1951 
to 1995 has shown that EU issues mattered very little in 
German quality newspapers (Van de Steeg 2005: 145-
146). If the coverage of the EU has remained fairly limit-
ed in a traditionally pro-EU country, the potential for an 
increasing visibility of the EU in other countries seems 
even more remote. Another investigation of the cover-
age of five EC/EU summits between 1969 and 1991 in 
German, French and British newspapers has suggested 
the importance of “fall and rise”, that is, significant fluctu-
ations in the treatment of the EU: for example, while the 
1991 Maastricht summit received much attention, oth-
er posterior ratifications such as the debates about the 
Treaty of Amsterdam obtained no such visibility (Meyer 
2008: 327-340). Meyer suggests that even though EC/
EU summits are the “masterpieces” of EU politics and 
foster an increased public visibility of the EU, the “Eu-
ropean actuality” still remains marginal in terms of the 
news overall. Another study has also demonstrated 
that “European affairs are not covered routinely”, but 
tend to be given a “fragmented treatment linked with 
the important events of the European institutional ac-
tuality” (Le Torrec and Garcia 2003: 122). Overall, while 
scholars disagree about whether the visibility of the EU 
and European affairs has increased over time, they nev-
ertheless converge, explicitly or implicitly, on the idea 
that domestic actors and nationally-oriented claims still 
dominate importantly. Independently of the normative 
debate related with the actual existence (or not) of a 
European public sphere, most authors do agree that 
‘Europe’ and ‘European integration’ generally remain 
secondary issues for domestic political parties as com-
pared with national matters.
Risse (2010: 118) rightly asserts that “the more European 
and EU issues are reported by comparison to national 
or local issues, the more we could claim a europeanisa-
tion of public spheres”. However, it is rather the continu-
ous marginalisation of EU institutions and actors that 
has prevailed in domestic politics. The treatment of EU 
affairs continues to fluctuate between visible conjunc-
tures surrounding the EU´s ‘great bargains’ and a rela-
tive invisibility under routine periods. Top-down vertical 
claims, characterised by demands from supranational 
actors on domestic actors and institutions, have re-
mained relatively marginal over the last fifteen years in 
domestic political spaces. The public communication of 
EU institutions and actors has continuously been poor-
ly presented in domestic public spheres, demonstrat-
ing little change in that respect, so that it has remained 
a “surrealist communication” characterised by structural 
weaknesses and limits (Dacheux 1994: 159-166).
It is nonetheless true that national parties have adapted 
in a certain way to the development of EU integration, to 
the extent that they have directed a greater proportion 
of their claims towards (and generally against) the EU 
level, and slightly incorporated the “European dimen-
sion” into their national political discourses. These trends 
are interesting in themselves given that they show that 
parties have not been immune to the process of EU in-
tegration. Yet, if the level of analysis is displaced to con-
sider the broader effects of these dynamics of adapta-
tion to the more general ways through which parties 
compete, it can be said that apart from during specific 
and temporarily limited conjunctures, EU issues have 
continuously remained marginalised. Parties have not 
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remained completely “frozen” in their response to the 
development of EU integration, yet it cannot be stated 
that important changes have occurred. Rather, party 
organisations have developed strategies of “conserva-
tive modernisation”, understood as limited adaptations 
and strategic uses of Europe, that have nonetheless led 
them to maintain their broad traditional patterns of 
behaviour (Badie 1992: 48-57; Jacquot and Woll 2004). 
Therefore, it seems clear that contrary to the important 
speculations that dominate the literature, nothing can 
tell us that a greater “europeanisation” of domestic poli-
tics has occurred - or necessarily will occur in the future.
In fact this prospect seems even more unlikely given 
the limits of most of the investigations in this field of 
research, which mainly consider national debates over 
Europe through the lens of domestic newspapers (Erbe 
2005: 75-92; Adam 2007: 409-433). Indeed, it is well-
known that, in practice, most people receive their news 
about the EU from television and tabloids, rather than 
from radios and quality newspapers (Blumler 1983). De 
Vreese et al. have, for instance, emphasised that the 
television coverage of the EU in the weeks prior to the 
1999 and to the 2004 EU elections, was very marginal 
in all EU member states (De Vreese et al. 2006: 477-504). 
Pfetsch et al. have shown that the tabloids in Germany, 
Spain and the Netherlands generally comment on the 
EU even less than quality newspapers, while Peter and 
De Vreese have concluded that the EU remains almost 
entirely absent from television coverage, stating that 
“television has not left the nation-state” (Pfetsch 2008: 
474; Peter and De Vreese 2004: 18). Hence, by focusing 
on quality newspapers rather than on tabloids, TV or ra-
dios coverage, most investigations tend to exaggerate 
the degree to which national public spheres might be 
europeanised (De Vreese and Boomgarden 2003: 361-
381).  
This implies that the very limited, temporally confined 
and spatially secluded europeanisation of national po-
litical debates that can be observed under routine pe-
riods in domestic newspapers and electoral campaigns 
would be even more limited in practice. Even in qual-
ity newspapers, which are arguably read by a limited 
and rather “elitist” public, the absence of europeanised 
debates generally predominates. Risse himself recog-
nises that “if EU affairs are not reported at all, we do not 
need to worry about a European public sphere any fur-
ther” (Risse 2010: 116). Agreeing that a European public 
sphere could theoretically emerge “through the process 
by which people debate controversial issues in public”, 
this study nevertheless questions whether this process 
has taken place up in the EU to date (Risse 2010: 111). 
The visibility of EU institutions and actors, as well as the 
general treatment of European affairs is still relatively 
marginal in domestic public spheres, apart from dur-
ing specific and limited conjunctures. If one considers 
the evolutions at stake from a broad longitudinal per-
spective, it appears that it is the nationalisation of the 
EU and the bottom-up transposition of the nationally-
based visions of domestic actors towards Europe that 
have prevailed, and that continue to do so.
1.2. The myth of transnational Euro-
pean debates
The idea that the discussion of EU-related issues would 
have been characterised by increasingly convergent 
frames and transnational exchanges across EU mem-
ber states is also widespread among those who claim 
an emerging “European identity” (Robyn 2005; Checkel 
2009: 1-25). Fossum and Schlesinger speak, for instance, 
of a European-wide “communicative space in the mak-
ing” (Fossum and Schlesinger 2007: 12). Ulrike Liebert 
also argues that “transnational communication has giv-
en foreign actors a direct voice and has led them to in-
corporate foreign arguments, positive as well as nega-
tive, into national public discourses” (Liebert 2007: 254). 
On the basis of the study of four EU-wide controversies 
(the Haider debate, the ratification of the EU Constitu-
tion, the debates over enlargement and on EU foreign 
and security policies), Risse argues that shared frames 
of reference appeared across the distinct EU member 
states. He concludes that “a community of communica-
tion in the making” can be observed through the grow-
ing interconnectedness between EU-related debates in 
distinct countries (Risse 2010: 139-157). Barbara Berkel 
also argued that a tendency that could be character-
ised by a greater “parallelism” emerged in the news and 
commentary on the Haider conflict in Austrian, British, 
German and French newspapers (Berkel 2006: 85-104).
However, to paraphrase Andy Smith, it seems that 
many scholars have developed an “aerial view” of what 
a public sphere is, leading them to mix the potential 
emergence of a European public sphere (that exists) 
with its actual existence (that does not yet exist) (Smith 
1999: 169-180). Hence, while this study does not deny 
that transnational political debates on EU matters have 
sometimes occurred, it argues that they have remained 
sporadic and fairly limited to specific conjunctures and 
controversies. Risse suggests that the extent of transna-
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tional patterns of communication is attested by the de-
gree to which “national media observe political debates 
and conflicts in fellow European countries” (Risse 2010: 
118). Overall, there is nevertheless little evidence of this 
type of “horizontal europeanisation” linked with trans-
national references to other EU member states. In other 
words, it seems reductive to focus on limited conjunc-
tures only to later argue that transnational exchanges 
over EU matters have progressed. Instead, if one takes 
a broader longitudinal outlook, it appears that transna-
tional communication over EU matters constitutes a 
convenient myth that, nonetheless, remains marginal 
and sporadic. Several recent investigations have ques-
tioned the reality of transnational patterns of commu-
nication over European issues, as well as the idea of a 
“gradual” emergence of transnational communicative 
exchanges (Baisnée 2007: 493-303; Mesnil 2000: 58-75). 
It could even be said that this premise reproduces the 
same dilemma that characterises the neo-functionalist 
theory, as it suggests the existence of a process that 
would progress inherently (Haas 1958). 
Other authors have shown that, to date, it is difficult to 
speak of a greater “transnationalisation” of the debates 
over Europe across EU member states. Focusing on 
Austrian, Danish, French, German and British newspa-
pers, Wessler and his coauthors find, for instance, that 
“Europe” became the object of identification in only 5 
percent of the articles they studied, concluding that a 
“distinctly European discourse involving speakers from 
EU institutions and from other European countries only 
take place in the small number of articles which actu-
ally focus on EU policymaking” (Wessler et al. 2008: 46-
51). While he recognises that “the transnationalisation 
of discourses and its interdiscursivity” are mostly con-
fined to EU actors and national governments, Risse nev-
ertheless concludes that a “transnational and Europe-
an-wide” public sphere would be in the making (Risse 
2010: 170). However, in my view, the fact that the de-
gree of “horizontal” patterns of communication across 
EU member states has remained marginal and limited 
to specific conjunctures constitutes clear evidence of a 
lack of europeanisation and transnationalisation.
1.3. The continuous nationalisation 
of European a!airs
A third point that importantly contradicts the idea of a 
“gradual europeanisation” of domestic political debates 
is the centrality of the nationalisation of EU affairs. In-
deed, it can be said that the debates over European 
integration have remained significantly nationalised in 
Western Europe, a pattern that has not really changed 
over the last twenty years. Another investigation has in 
fact concluded that two thirds of all actors mentioned 
in EU-related claims in British newspapers were national, 
and that only 15 percent were European (Statham and 
Geddes 2006: 248-269). It shows the continuous impor-
tance of nationalised debates, and of the transposition 
at the EU level of context-specific and nationally-based 
visions of the EU (Diez Medrano 2003). The EU contin-
ues to be introduced into national political debates as 
an addressee of proposals and critiques, rather than 
EU actors themselves playing an “active” role by mak-
ing demands. Domestic elites are also more commonly 
inclined to frame “Europe” depending on their national 
views and projects on the EU, or to use the EU level as a 
“blame-shifting” reference point, rather than to present 
and explain EU-related developments to their domestic 
publics (Schmidt 2007b: 270). 
Indeed, studying the media reporting on Eastern en-
largement in five European countries during the 1990s, 
Van de Steeg illustrates that references to a national 
“we” as the predominant focus for investigations have 
been used more frequently than references to a Euro-
pean “we” (Van de Steeg 2005: 125-129). On the basis of 
the analysis of editorials in German, Spanish and Brit-
ish newspapers between 1946 and 1997, Diez Medrano 
illustrated that the German and Spanish treatment of 
the EU was more positive than in Great-Britain, while 
these patterns have been rather stable over time, and 
have not been affected by the evolutions of the rela-
tionships that the respective countries have had with 
the EU (Diez Medrano 2003: 116-153). Oberhuber and 
his coauthors have only found convergent frames on 
constitutional issues, leading them to conclude that 
“within each country a different EU seems to be repre-
sented and different issues are debated” (Oberhuber et 
al. 2005: 263). That is why, contrary to Risse who argued 
that shared “liberal” and “nationalist” frames of reference 
over Europe can be distinguished across countries, this 
study argues that national differences still predomi-
nantly matter in the ways parties apprehend EU inte-
gration. 
Indeed, even though this study agrees that broad simi-
lar “master frames” can sometimes be delineated across 
countries, as Isabelle Guinaudeau and Simon Persico 
have demonstrated for party programmes, it nonethe-
less argues that these frames are not always salient in 
the same ways, while, in addition, they do not follow the 
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same hierarchies across countries, which consequently 
leads them to work in quite different ways (Guinaudeau 
and Persico 2011: 82-105). Thus, from the viewpoint of 
the themes and general judgments associated with EU 
integration, differences across countries arguably still 
prevail over similarities. Even though this article agrees 
that distinct “liberal” and “nationalist” visions of the EU 
can be delineated in each EU member states, what they 
imply strongly differs depending on the context con-
sidered, so that it seems misleading to argue on that 
basis that we would witness a greater convergence of 
europeanised frames. The idea of a “liberal” Europe is, for 
example. associated with completely different notions 
in Great-Britain and France: in the former, it implies a 
“modernisation” of the EU over an unnecessary politi-
cal union, and it is positively related with a common 
market favoured by sovereign states; by contrast, in the 
latter it is negatively perceived as “putting to death” the 
EU, as a triumph of deregulation and economics over 
integration and politics. Even though the theme is sim-
ilar, it is framed in completely different ways on each 
side of the Channel, so that the convergence around 
thematic issues should not so easily taken for granted.
On that point, it has been recently demonstrated that 
the question of Turkish membership to the EU has been 
framed by domestic party actors in French, Belgian, and 
British newspapers between 2004 and 2006 on the basis 
of three dominant “master frames”: enlargement, cultur-
al identity and the Islamic religion. Yet, what is interest-
ing here for our argument on the continuous nation-
alisation of EU affairs, is that while these three themes 
always dominate the treatment of Turkish membership 
in the three different countries, they are nevertheless 
associated with completely distinct types of arguments 
(Petithomme 2010: 60-70). Indeed, the enlargement of 
the EU is positively perceived by the British press so that 
the admission of Turkey, a “periphery at the image of 
Great-Britain”, is globally conceived as a factor of mod-
ernisation of the image of the EU, while it would help 
to contradict the representation of a “Christian Europe” 
and the picture of a “clash of civilisations” with the rest 
of the world (Petithomme 2010: 78). In France, the en-
largement to include Turkey is strongly criticised as a 
symbol of the “dilution of the political character of the 
EU”, so that political actors are generally opposed to 
this “in principle”. In Belgium, the dominant frames are 
more moderately opposed to Turkish membership, to 
the extent that they remain conditional on the deepen-
ing of the political character of the EU: an enlargement 
to Turkey could potentially be accepted, but only if the 
EU would first and foremost progress more decisively 
towards a federal political union (Petithomme 2010: 71-
77). 
The same could be said about the themes of cultural 
identity and Islamic religion that dominate the framing 
of Turkish membership, but operates in different direc-
tions in the three countries: such themes are associated 
with a type of “defiance” against Turkey in France, with 
“suspicion” and conditional arguments in Belgium, and 
with “hope” for better inter-cultural relationships in the 
British press. The way Turkish membership to the EU is 
framed is also dependent upon internal controversies 
in France, on the broader debates on the “political” pro-
ject of the EU in Belgium, and on the general relation-
ships that the country has with the EU in Great-Britain 
(Petithomme 2010: 105-106). Clarifying these elements 
helps to illustrate the idea that even though similar “mas-
ter frames” over Europe can sometimes be found across 
distinct EU member-states, they only emerge sporadi-
cally during controversial EU-related debates, whereas 
overall, the ways party actors apprehend the EU remain 
very dependent on the national variable. That is why, on 
the basis of a broad longitudinal outlook, the idea that 
“national differences in the use of frames recede into 
the background” can be questioned: thus, rather than 
a gradual “europeanisation” and “transnationalisation” of 
domestic public spheres, what seems to prevail is the 
continuous importance of “nationally-based European 
views” (Risse 2010: 119).
Con!ict and polarisation over Eu-
ropean matters:
The prevalence of convergence 
and depoliticisation
Another major argument in the literature could be con-
ceptualised as the “rising euroscepticism” thesis, that is 
to say, the idea that conflict and polarisation over EU 
matters would have progressed over the last twenty 
years. We would witness the end of the “permissive 
consensus” that led political elites to be “able to pursue 
their own policy interests because of public disinter-
est” (Carubba 2001: 141-158). Conflict over EU matters 
would increasingly follow Kantner´s issue cycles criteria, 
in the sense that “the same issues are discussed at the 
same time using the same criteria of relevance” (Kant-
ner 2006: 501-523). “Debating Europe” would increas-
ingly tackle the EU´s democratic deficit, as a first step 
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to democratising the EU (Trenz and Eder 2004: 5-25). 
While this study agrees that conflict and polarisation 
over EU matters have sometimes occurred, it argues 
that they have remained sporadic and contextual rather 
than inherently increasing. Radical parties have periodi-
cally managed to politicise Europe in certain political 
arenas, but they have failed to foster spill-over effects to 
restructure the broader patterns of political exchange. 
At times “Euroscepticism” has upsurged, but it has been 
actively contained by mainstream parties through the 
recurrent reaffirmation of consensual stances towards 
the EU. Three elements are thus considered: the preva-
lence of consensual elite discourses over Europe, the 
ways parties have “compartmentalised” intra-party divi-
sions over Europe, and the twofold behaviour of main-
stream and peripheral opposition parties.
2.1. The prevalence of consensual 
elite discourses over Europe
To begin with, it has been said that conflict and polari-
sation over EU matters have progressed over the last 
fifteen years, given that the same European themes 
would have become increasingly controversial and 
debated at the same time across the distinct domes-
tic public spheres of EU member states. Van de Steeg 
argued for instance that an almost identical issue cycle 
occurred across Europe during the Haider debate (Van 
de Steeg 2006: 609-634). Investigating the treatment of 
the discussions on the “Future of Europe” in six EU coun-
tries, Trenz concluded that the controversies followed 
similar highs and lows (Trenz 2007: 93-95). In a compar-
ative study of the debates on EU enlargement and on 
the EU constitutional project in the German and French 
quality press, Adam nonetheless showed that only the 
treatment of constitutional issues witnessed similar cy-
cles between 2000 and 2002 (Adam 2008: 101-102). In 
fact, the same European themes only seem to be de-
bated at the same time when they relate to constitu-
tional issues or to the “great debates” of EU politics, so 
that over the long term, it is the fluctuating visibility of 
European politics - mirrored by the “highs” and “lows” of 
the European political agenda that has arguably pre-
vailed (Hubé 2003: 69-87).
Indeed, evidences exist showing that conflicts over EU 
matters have sometimes occurred: for example, the 
referendums on the Maastricht Treaty and on the rati-
fication of the ECT have been particularly conflicting in 
France, as well as the referendums on the first Nice Trea-
ty and the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland. On the basis of the 
case of Great-Britain - where few debates take place on 
European integration as Euroscepticism is shared across 
the party system - it could be said that the more or less 
important saliency of EU matters in domestic elections 
might be related more to the degree of polarisation be-
tween mainstream parties on the EU dimension, than 
to the dominance of negative frames towards the EU. In 
fact, it can be argued that he mobilisation of the “Euro-
pean dimension” by radical parties will have no effect on 
a broader restructuration of political cleavages as long 
as it does not divide mainstream parties (within or be-
tween them). One crucial condition is that mainstream 
parties need to be sufficiently divided and polarised on 
European integration, otherwise it would remain a “va-
lence” and consensual issue that would not affect politi-
cal competition (Budge et al. 2001: 1945-1998).
However, it has also been demonstrated in the literature 
that state actors and especially executive actors belong-
ing to the incumbent party, have generally been better 
represented in national debates over EU issues, while 
MPs, extra-parliamentary actors and other civil society 
actors have remained rather secondary and poorly rep-
resented in domestic debates over Europe. Under rou-
tine periods, mainstream party families have also been 
generally more successful in assuring visibility for their 
claims over Europe, while peripheral parties, whether 
from the extreme-right or the extreme-left, have faced 
more significant difficulties in obtaining a greater vis-
ibility for their claims over Europe. Given that main-
stream parties (with the exception of the British Con-
servatives) generally frame Europe in consensual and 
pro-European ways, pro-EU and office-seeking parties 
are consequently much more represented in EU-related 
debates than peripheral parties under routine periods. 
These elements reinforce the idea that EU integration 
remains an elite-dominated field, while asymmetries of 
powers, both between state and civil society actors on 
the one hand, and mainstream and peripheral parties 
on the other hand, still remain determinant. “European” 
debates at the national level are typically dominated by 
the arguments of one or two individuals from domestic 
executives and mainstream opposition leaders. In fact, 
it could even be said that they rarely take the form of 
“debates” understood as organised controversies, and 
inversely, that they frequently remain limited to con-
sensual, “technical” and disincarnated statements.
That is why, contrary to the thesis of a “rising euroscepti-
cism”, it can be argued that, if one takes a longitudinal 
viewpoint, conflicts over EU matters rarely arise in prac-
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tice: indeed, the general structure of political exchang-
es over EU matters under routine periods has generally 
been dominated by consensually positive claims over 
Europe in Western European party systems. Beyond 
routine periods, the same kind of pattern can arguably 
be delineated during national elections. The national 
variable has importantly contributed and continues to 
play a central role in differentiating the general tones 
of the debates on EU matters across countries. Domes-
tic campaigns have not witnessed a shift towards more 
critiques on Europe over the last fifteen years, but have 
rather been characterised by an interesting stability in 
the types of tones associated with the EU depending 
on the country considered. 
Therefore, in the light of these elements this article ar-
gues that EU integration constitutes a field where the 
consensus between mainstream party elites has re-
mained particularly important, fostering a process that 
has effectively “encapsulated” the potential contesta-
tion of EU matters. Arnaud Mercier defined a public 
sphere as a “symbolic space where the discourses are 
exchanged, most of them contradictory, of the distinct 
social, religious, cultural, and political actors that com-
pose a society” (Mercier 2003: 10). What is interesting 
here is that the application of the notion of a public 
sphere itself to the EU remains relatively questionable, 
to the extent that under routine periods, “Europe” is still 
almost exclusively framed by a very limited set of politi-
cal actors, especially by the incumbent elites of the ex-
ecutive, which themselves generally share consensual 
and rather positive views over the EU. Thus, the politici-
sation of European matters has remained sporadic and 
temporarily limited to specific conjunctures more than 
inherently rising over time, while it has also been ac-
tively confined to certain electoral channels, especially 
through the use of EU referendums.
Internal con"icts within parties: en-
capsulating the politicisation of EU 
matters
The thesis of a “rising euroscepticism” may also be chal-
lenged from the viewpoint of the economy of intra-
party relationships. Indeed, in the specific contexts of 
EU referendums and their aftermaths, the “European 
dimension” has sometimes contributed to question 
the lines over EU integration of certain types of parties 
through their greater likelihood of facing factionalism 
and dissent. Under certain circumstances, EU referen-
dums have contributed to bring about broader de-
bates on EU integration within domestic parties. Here, 
two main elements need to be addressed. On the one 
hand, several studies have suggested that EU-related 
issues generally constitute an engine of dislocation of 
the militant link, in the sense that party leaderships 
tend to search the “blind conformity” of their rank-and-
file members with the official line of their party on the 
EU. The elitist impositions of the lines of the parties on 
the EU arguably reinforce the already existing principle 
of delegation and the primacy of the injunctions to-
wards consensus on EU matters that indirectly foster 
the “self-exclusion” of the party members that hold al-
ternative ideas on the EU. On the other hand, while this 
factor of intra-party frustration can pave the way for an 
internal politicisation of EU matters, party leaderships 
have nevertheless developed active strategies to com-
partmentalise the emergence of such cleavages over 
Europe within their organisations.
Intra-party relationships and the 
continuation of the “permissive con-
sensus”
From the viewpoint of the economy of intra-party re-
lationships, it can be argued that rather than leading 
to an increasing politicisation, under routine periods, 
European integration has, conversely, frequently led to 
the maintenance of a type of “permissive consensus” 
between party elites on the one hand, that have active-
ly controlled the definition of the stances of their or-
ganisations over Europe, and the rest of party members 
on the other hand (Lindberg and Scheingold 1963). 
More than the rise of an increasing contestation of the 
EU within domestic party organisations, this study ar-
gues that, overall, it is the “confinement” of EU-related 
debates to party elites that has prevailed. Debates over 
European matters have only rarely emerged, and when 
they have, only to a fairly limited extent, yet even in 
these cases, the legitimacy of party militants and of sec-
ondary party figures to defend their alternative views 
on the EU has been frequently questioned by the elites, 
illustrating clear distinctions between the preferences 
of the party leaderships and rank-and-file members.
Indeed, it could be said that the “permissive consensus” 
is far from obsolete from the perspective of intra-party 
dynamics: for instance, the leaderships of several main-
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stream opposition parties which have been significantly 
divided over European matters, have actively reinforced 
their autonomies by defining the lines of their parties 
over Europe in the aftermath of EU referendums. The 
convocation of internal debates or referendums on Eu-
ropean matters, as well as the broad usages of “delibera-
tive democracy”, while fostering internal deliberations, 
have nonetheless often been conceived by the elites as 
procedures of ratification of their own views through 
a careful planning of the contest agenda (Le Goff and 
Girard 2011). These procedures have often remained 
very instrumental for reinforcing the legitimacy of the 
party direction, or to solve a situation of internal crisis, 
rather than being used exclusively to decide (demo-
cratically) the party’s line on the EU. This kind of persis-
tent “permissive consensus” and self-exclusion of party 
militants from potential discussions on EU matters can 
be explained by three factors related to the relative in-
difference of militants, as well as to the autonomy and 
pragmatism of party elites.
The first element – illustrating that under routine peri-
ods the indifference of militants has arguably prevailed 
over a manifest euroscepticism – is constituted, in anal-
ogy with ordinary citizens, by a twofold sense of “dis-
tance and complexity” that has dominated their rela-
tively “impossible appropriation” of the EU (Duchesne 
and Van Ingelgom 2008: 143-164; Roger 2007: 37-53). 
Indeed, the perception of the technical nature of Euro-
pean issues and the weak publicity around EU regula-
tions has arguably reinforced a process of self-exclusion 
of party militants from the potential discussions on EU 
issues, as a result of a perceived lack of competence. 
In a certain way, the objective and subjective distance 
from the European centres of power, perpetuates the 
reproduction of a certain indifference and “militant pas-
sivity” under routine periods, that tend to contradict the 
idea that EU issues have increasingly become matters 
of contention within party organisations: most of the 
time, party elites have (in practice) obtained a legiti-
macy, by default, in the choice of the European line of 
their parties through a persistent “permissive consen-
sus”. Consequently, the autonomy that is granted to 
party elites in the definition of the European lines of 
their parties frequently constitutes a privileged way for 
party militants to “reduce the complexity” associated 
with the European integration process by trusting their 
directions with these issues, which then obtain an “au-
tonomy by default” (Caprara 2007: 151-164).
The second element is the general interest of party 
elites in maintaining within the leaderships the discus-
sion and the definition of the lines over Europe of their 
respective organisations, in order to preserve their au-
tonomies, to maintain the centrality of the principle of 
delegation and their important margins of manoeuver 
in European decision-making processes. This has also 
been interestingly considered by Guillaume Dusei-
gneur who illustrated, in a study of the internal deliber-
ations over Europe of Swedish parties, that EU issues are 
not generally evoked during party congresses because 
party elites consider that those conjunctures have to 
constitute “moments of internal communion” and of 
ratification of the overall orientations of the party, rather 
than to provide conjunctures that would foster internal 
debates on issues that are judged to be “too technical” 
(Duseigneur 2011: 10). In practice, EU integration con-
tinues to be treated as an “external” issue and a matter 
of international relations, so that only a limited group of 
a “happy few” maintains its monopoly on how Europe 
should be perceived and framed (Duseigneur 2011: 10). 
This example clearly highlights how the leadership has 
sequenced its discourse to preserve its autonomy and 
to reaffirm its pro-EU line. It can finally be said that this 
type of “stratarchy” applies both to the relationships 
that party leaderships entertain with their rank-and-
file members, and to the links between the actors in-
volved in decision-making processes at the EU level, 
and the other domestic parties and party actors whose 
activities remain confined at the domestic level. Rob-
ert Ladrech has emphasised this process of reinforce-
ment of the autonomy of domestic elites, especially for 
the parties that are implicated in government (Ladrech 
2007: 216-218). This autonomy of the executive elites 
involved in EU decision-making processes is also in-
directly reinforced by the relative “illegibility” of MEPs 
within their national political spaces, and by the weak-
ness of domestic parliamentary controls over European 
matters (Costa 2009: 129-155; Grossman and Sauger 
2007: 1117-1134). 
Thirdly, contradicting the idea of a growing contesta-
tion of EU matters within parties, the willingness of 
party elites to compartmentalise the potential debates 
over Europe has appeared quite clearly through the im-
portance of pragmatism in their behaviour. While this 
principle is broadly applicable to conventional political 
life, it can be said that it has particularly applied to the 
definition of the European lines of mainstream parties, 
in the sense that their stances have frequently remained 
intentionally and strategically vague to let party leader-
ships preserve important margins of autonomy. That is 
why most of the time, internal cohesion and consensus 
Interdisciplinary Political Studies
Vol.2, No. 1 Special issue, March 2012
©IdPS
76
ISSN 2039-8573 online
are taken for granted by party leaderships and present-
ed as symbols of “coherence” against other formations, 
even though in practice, it is generally the absence of 
debates that prevails. The argument of partisan consen-
sus over EU matters is even further propagated, to the 
extent that it enables parties to present the politicisa-
tion of European issues as “irresponsible”. The fact that 
pro-Europeanism is often taken for granted by party 
leaderships illustrates well the persistence of a type 
of “permissive consensus” within parties. Therefore, it 
could be said that pragmatism and even a “mercenary 
approach towards integration”, as Holmes suggested, 
still constitute principles that guide the ways party 
elites apprehend EU issues (Holmes 2005: 12).
Party leaderships and the “compart-
mentalisation” of EU issues
On the other hand, contradicting the idea of a potential 
progression of internal conflicts over EU matters, party 
leaderships have arguably developed active strategies 
of temporal and spatial “compartmentalisation” of EU 
issues, to avoid or to try to confine the emergence of 
internal divisions on European matters. While enabling 
the parties to maintain their cohesion, such strategies 
have nonetheless directly contributed to the depolitici-
sation of EU-related debates within party organisations. 
Temporal compartmentalisation can be first observed 
through the choice by the leadership of the “European 
moments” within parties, understood as specific con-
junctures when internal debates over Europe have 
been favoured to better contain their potential emer-
gence in other more sensitive political conjunctures. 
It is clear that during conventional and routine politi-
cal periods, European issues are in fact rarely debated 
within parties. Moreover, the precautious choice of the 
electoral calendar by party leaders aims to keep EU is-
sues “under quarantine” (Duseigneur 2005: 74-91).
The temporal compartmentalisation of EU issues also 
expresses itself through the sequencing of the dis-
course of mainstream parties on EU integration, nota-
bly through legitimising “euro-critique” voices during 
certain political conjunctures, while later on reaffirm-
ing the pro-EU consensus, which enables them to op-
timise the pursuit of contradictory political objectives. 
These strategies of sequencing of their discourses over 
Europe do not apply to radical parties given that they 
present a coherent oppositional stance: their attitudes 
of opposition towards the government generally con-
verge with their critiques of the modalities of EU inte-
gration. In practice, the strategies of temporal compart-
mentalisation privileged by the elites take the form of 
a recurrent motto: “let´s discuss this later” (Aylott 2002: 
441-461). Thus, government parties have importantly 
sequenced their discourses on European integration 
over time, alternating between critical postures on the 
one hand, and the reaffirmation of the pro-European 
consensus on the other hand, depending on the pre-
cise “sequences” of the political debate considered.
Furthermore, the “compartmentalisation” of EU issues 
is also expressed through the intermediary of spatial 
logics, the more classical application of which remains 
the tendency to substitute, as far as possible, political 
competition on EU issues with national and even local 
questions. This “nationalisation” of the focus of political 
competition has been recurrently observed by several 
scholars (Hayward and Fallon 2011: 159-173). Pro-EU 
opposition parties have also often downplayed their 
engagements with EU referendum campaigns, choos-
ing strategies of “silent mobilisation” and leaving the ini-
tiative to the government. Moreover, “permanent” cam-
paigns focused on national issues have also constituted 
a powerful engine for the spatial compartmentalisation 
of EU issues, because the debates that are potentially 
associated with “Europe” in the context of EU elections 
and referendums are constantly pushed towards “other 
arenas” of political competition and “other moments” of 
political debates.
Overall, mainstream party leaderships have used rela-
tively similar organisational, intra-personal, ideological, 
and competitive strategies to limit the potential spill-
over effects that the nascent intra-party debates over 
Europe could have engendered on their organisations. 
During referendum campaigns, these parties have tried 
to confine the debates to the direction, while recognis-
ing the rights of dissidents to exercise distinct “voices” 
in parallel with a demand of “loyalty” in order to confine 
them to a type of “cooperative factionalism” (Boucek 
2009: 455-485). Nevertheless, the moral condemnation 
of dissidents has not generally engendered practical 
sanctions, given that party leaderships have preferred 
to present these divergences as symbols of “pluralism”. 
While the leaders of pro-European opposition parties 
necessarily have to compromise personally with the 
defense of the “Yes”, under certain circumstances they 
have also granted freedom of vote to the members and to 
the sympathisers of their parties. Finally, tendencies towards 
procrastination and towards the report of ideological de-
bates on European matters have also been recurrent.
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The twofold behaviour of opposition 
parties over Europe and the tem-
porary displacement of traditional 
cleavages
In addition to the prevalence of consensual elite dis-
courses over Europe and to the containment of internal 
conflicts within parties, another element that has clear-
ly appeared in the literature is related with the twofold 
behaviour of opposition parties over the EU. Such issue 
is crucial as it enables us to explain why convergence 
and depoliticisation over EU integration have generally 
prevailed over conflict and polarisation. The twofold 
behaviour of opposition parties over the EU enables us 
to consider why the politicisation of EU matters has re-
mained very contextual; less linked to the role of radical 
political entrepreneurs than it is usually recognised; and 
significantly dependent on the political arena consid-
ered.
First, the twofold behaviour of opposition parties over 
the EU has appeared in several studies through their 
clearly distinct stances whether under routine peri-
ods, in the context of national elections or in EU ref-
erendums: while mainstream opposition parties have 
almost always taken pro-EU positions, peripheral oppo-
sition parties have remained confined to anti-European 
positions. This has engendered important effects, in the 
sense that the “normal” structures of political competi-
tion have remained characterised by a pro-EU consen-
sus shared within the mainstream, so that peripheral 
opposition parties have faced significant difficulties in 
mobilising the European cleavage and dividing their 
opponents on this issue. On that point, Hooghe and 
Marks argue that EU integration is no longer a “low sa-
lience issue for the general public” while its influence 
on party competition would have increased (Hooghe 
and Marks 2008: 7). They argue that the “closed shops of 
government leaders, interest groups and Commission 
officials have been bypassed as European issues have 
entered party competition” (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 
9). It is true that with the ratifications over the Maas-
tricht Treaty in 1992, EU integration has tended to be-
come more contentious.  
However, recent studies also suggest that the salien-
cy of EU issues in general election campaigns has re-
mained very low, and importantly influenced by con-
textual factors (Kriesi 2007: 83-108). Thus, the argument 
that EU issues have become more contested remains 
questionable: one might indeed argue that, ultimately, 
EU matters still remain marginal. Hooghe and Marks 
(2008: 8-9) themselves recognise that “the level of pub-
lic support in 2005 is not much lower than in 1985”. In 
fact, it could be said that the respective positions of 
mainstream parties have not generally been sufficient-
ly divided to allow for peripheral opposition parties to 
mobilise the European cleavage, so that in the end, the 
politicisation of EU issues has remained very depend-
ent on contextual factors and limited to specific politi-
cal conjunctures. 
Second, the twofold behaviour of opposition parties 
also implies that paradoxically, the politicisation of EU 
matters seems to be less linked to the role of peripheral 
opposition parties than is usually suggested. Indeed, it 
is often said that peripheral opposition parties play a 
crucial role in mobilising the tension related to EU in-
tegration (Franklin and Van der Eijk 2007: 189-208). It is 
clear that under certain circumstances, political entre-
preneurs have contested EU issues, but it could also be 
said that this has not always been the case, nor has con-
testation occurred equally in all political arenas. The role 
of political entrepreneurs belonging to radical parties in 
politicising EU integration has arguably been crucial in 
the context of certain EU referendums. Yet, if the thesis 
of a rising euroscepticism would hold, then we would 
expect that these parties would have also contributed 
to politicise EU integration in European as well as in na-
tional elections. However, EU elections have remained 
the paradise of “lost voters” over the last twenty years, 
and have been characterised by increasing abstention 
and popular withdrawal. National elections themselves 
have not globally witnessed more debates on EU af-
fairs, to the extent that the important degrees of con-
vergence between mainstream parties have prevented 
potential conflicts from occurring. Under routine peri-
ods, the anti-EU claims of peripheral opposition parties 
have been much less represented in domestic public 
spheres than is usually recognised. Thus, it could be 
said that the mobilisation of radical eurosceptic parties 
seems to be a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition 
for conflicts to emerge over EU matters.
In fact, as Hanspeter Kriesi and his colleagues have ar-
gued, the contestation of EU integration seems to be 
part and parcel of the broader cleavage transforma-
tion associated with globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2006: 
921-956). EU integration contributes to reverse a pro-
cess of national boundary construction consolidated 
over the centuries, in the sense that it provides exit 
possibilities for individuals who had previously been 
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nationally bound (Bartolini 2005: 116). The progresses 
of the parties that criticise EU integration illustrate the 
strengthening of an anti-globalisation discourse in de-
fense of a preference towards “nationals” and in favour 
of economic protectionism in which the EU dimension 
is melded, rather than expressing “opposition of princi-
ple” to the idea of a united Europe (Kircheimer 1957: 128-
156). Radical right-wing parties might have progressed in 
Europe over the last fifteen years, but they have arguably 
done so as much through the rejection of immigrants, 
Islam, and economic globalisation, than on the basis of 
the mobilisation of the single EU issue (Ivaldi 2004). As 
Peter Mair puts it, few, if any, parties have been exclu-
sively created on the contestation of the EU issue, that 
has played the role of “another stick” reinforcing “an al-
ready existing armoury” based on a broader nationalist 
and anti-globalisation discourse (Mair 2000: 27-51).
Third, another effect of the twofold behaviour of opposi-
tion parties on the EU has also clearly appeared, to the 
extent that while mainstream opposition parties have 
generally maintained their pro-EU stances and tried to 
depoliticise EU matters, peripheral opposition parties 
have been more likely to politicise the European cleav-
age in certain political arenas than in others. Indeed, 
under certain circumstances, EU referendums have 
been more prone to politicisation, while in contrast, the 
saliency of EU issues has remained very low in national 
election campaigns, and mainstream parties have also 
actively downplayed their commitments to EU election 
campaigns. Some national elections have witnessed 
more EU-related debates than others, while the proxim-
ity to EU Treaty ratifications has arguably played an im-
portant role in influencing the saliency of EU matters. 
However, independent of the role played by periph-
eral opposition parties, what seems to be crucial for a 
greater politicisation to occur is that mainstream parties 
also need to be sufficiently divided over EU matters – a 
condition that has rarely occurred. Yet, in the context of 
EU referendums, the dominant party of the opposition 
has generally colluded with incumbent parties on the 
support towards the Treaty at stake. More than ideologi-
cal, institutional, or organisational factors, it is the specific 
party system “situation” that increases the probability of 
intra-party dissent, while this has engendered recurrent 
difficulties for parties to sway supporters to their side. 
Manifesting a pattern of cartelisation on EU issues, this 
explains why under circumstances of intense mobilisa-
tion from peripheral opposition parties, EU referendums 
have sometimes contributed to awaken the “sleeping gi-
ant” that otherwise remains dormant in other contexts.
Conclusion
To conclude, what can it be said regarding the ways 
national parties have adapted their strategies of com-
petition and behaviour to use, handle, and manage 
the European issue in domestic political competition? 
Overall, it can be stated that parties have designed 
different strategies to adapt to European integration. 
First, domestic parties have incorporated “European” 
issues within their political discourses, but it has not 
necessarily led to a greater “europeanisation” of do-
mestic political debates to the extent that dominant 
parties share relatively similar positions on European 
matters. Second, the position of a given party within 
its party system remains a crucial variable to under-
stand whether it is likely to support a greater politici-
zation of European matters (while in the opposition 
or for peripheral parties), or to resist to such politicisa-
tion (while in government). Third, it can be said that 
the likelihood of politicisation occurring has been very 
dependent on the arena and the context considered: 
few conflicts over the EU have occurred in national 
and European elections, but more in EU referendums. 
That is why, it can be said that few changes have oc-
curred over the last fifteen years regarding the con-
sensual and relatively positive treatment of the EU 
in national newspapers, the very limited saliency of 
EU-related debates in national electoral campaigns 
and the tendency of mainstream parties to converge 
rather than diverge on the ways they frame the EU. 
EU issues continue to be treated marginally. Thus, it 
is the structural absence of conflict that prevails over 
the development of a rising eurosecpticism. Conflicts 
over EU matters are not typical, nor are they inherent-
ly on the increase: they remain the exception rather 
than the rule. Politicisation has sometimes occurred, 
but only in specific conjunctures, and in general it has 
faded away fairly quickly, given that the emergent de-
bates on Europe have been actively condemned and 
contained by mainstream parties through distinct 
strategies of confinement. Otherwise, it is the con-
finement of EU matters to certain spatial arenas and 
limited temporal circumstances, and the predomi-
nance of marginalisation and depoliticisation under 
routine periods, which prevails. Therefore, there is still 
a “missing link” in domestic political debates, given 
that EU institutions and actors generally continue 
not to be represented, even though in practice they 
might constitute important factors of change in do-
mestic policy-making.
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Abstract
This article addresses the issue of the relationship between ‘the market’ and democracy in the European Union from a 
critical political economy perspective. It argues that the way the European Union institutions and national governments 
are attempting to solve the current economic and financial problems of the Eurozone enhances the trend towards ‘new 
constitutionalist’ arrangement that were already present. A detailed analysis of the reforms is proposed, as well as an 
historical perspective on the relationship between ‘the market’ and democracy that has characterised Western political 
economies. The recent reforms of EU economic governance are thus seen as furthering the insulation of socio-economic 
policy-making from public’s electoral accountability.
Introduction
Recent developments in the Eurozone, such as the 
formation of technocratic governments in Greece and 
Italy, the creation of new, more binding, European rules 
regarding public finances and the tough conditions 
posed in exchange for the granting of bailout pack-
ages, have been increasingly perceived by both public 
opinion and academia as a curtailment of the demo-
cratic principles that constitute the foundation of the 
European Union (EU) (McGiffen 2011; Streeck 2011).
The issue of the democratic deficit was and continues 
to be at the centre of academic attention (some clas-
sic works include Weiler et al 1995 and Coultrap 1999). 
While some scholars stress the inconsistency of the 
democratic deficit issue and, on the basis of arguments 
of efficiency and output legitimacy, reject the view of 
a democratic deficit problem that is specific to the EU 
(Moravcsik 2002; Crombez 2003), also on Pareto-effi-
cient grounds (Majone 1994; 2006), others continue to 
underline that the EU is much less than an ideal pol-
ity in democratic terms.  While a procedural electoral 
approach has focused on the lack of proper electoral 
institutions at European level (Decker 2002; Hix and 
Follesdal 2006; Lord and Beetham 2001), a delibera-
tive ‘Habermasian’ approach stresses the weakness of a 
European ‘public sphere’ or ‘strong public’ (Eriksen and 
Fossum 2002; Meny 2002) and what can be termed a 
‘social legitimacy’ analysis focuses on the issue of the 
lack of a European ‘demos’ (Bartolini 2006; Zielonska 
2006). 
However, from a critical political economy (Cox 1981, 
1983, 1987) perspective, as the one adopted in this 
study, it is more interesting to study the current state 
of democracy within the EU by looking at its continu-
ally evolving relationship with the sphere of ‘the mar-
ket’, itself the outcome of social and political struggles 
between classes that are constitutive of the capitalist 
mode of production. A crucial point regarding the de-
bate on the democratic deficit is that it often takes as 
given fixed definitions of what ‘democracy’ as such is, 
while seeking to compare this ideal to the EU. A histori-
cist critical political economy approach however, seeks 
to relate the historical manifestations of democracy 
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and the possibilities of democratic participation with 
the current phase of integration, without needing to fix 
once and for all what democracy or human freedom are. 
Scholars working within the critical political economy 
approach have focused on a variety of issues regarding 
European integration (Bieler and Morton 2001; Cafruny 
and Ryner 2003, 2007; van Apeldoorn, Drahokopuil and 
Horn 2009; van Apeldoorn 2002; Bieler 2006; Overbeek 
2003; Van der Pijl 2006b).
However, there has been no attempt so far to analyse 
the consequences that the recent reforms of European 
economic governance have had on democratic pro-
cesses from this perspective. Here my aim is to apply 
Gill’s concept of ‘new constitutionalism’ as a heuristic 
tool in order to shed new light on the European eco-
nomic governance reforms. ‘New constitutionalism’ 
describes a neoliberal international governance frame-
work whereby economic policies are increasingly sep-
arated from broad political accountability “in order to 
make governments more responsive to the discipline 
of market forces, and correspondingly less responsive 
to popular-democratic forces and processes” (Gill 2001: 
47). The argument proposed is that the enacted reforms 
will in fact exacerbate the trend towards a ‘new con-
stitutionalist’ framework by locking in a set of harsher 
constraints on the possibility of democratic processes 
to influence socio-economic policy making. 
The focus here is neither solely on EU institutions nor on 
member states. Rather, what is stressed is the character 
of transnationalism of the process of transformation, 
which must not be juxtaposed to either national and 
supranational: “transnational processes are those that 
take place simultaneously in subnational, national, and 
international arenas” (van Apeldoorn, Overbeek and 
Ryner 2003: 39).  A critical political economy approach 
thus goes beyond both state-centric and structuralist 
approaches, examining the social origin of state power 
in capital as a social force, a discipline over society and 
nature.  As Van der Pijl has argued, “capital remains a 
force that by preference seeks to occupy the intercon-
nections between separate political jurisdictions” (Van 
der Pijl 2006b: 15). Thus, the state-system and the logic 
of capital are interrelated and the current mode of pro-
duction has been characterised by transnational social 
relations. For the purposes of this paper, the main actors 
behind the process of ‘new constitutionalism’ are identi-
fied in the transnational historical bloc of social forces 
that has been at the origin of the neoliberal ‘compre-
hensive concept of control’ (Van der Pijl 1998 ch.4) and 
the concomitant shift to financialisation as a mode of 
accumulation (McNally 2011; Fine 2009).  This bloc, itself 
a political synthesis of interests and identities from dif-
ferent countries, is made up of a transnational manage-
rial class, other elements of transnationalising produc-
tive capital in manufacturing – including many small 
and medium enterprises involved in sub-contracting 
– and elements of financial capital involved in banking, 
insurance and finance (Bieler and Morton 2006 p.18; 
see Van der Pijl 1998; Bieler and Morton 2001). Crucially, 
the European Monetary Union (EMU) is seen as a stra-
tegic project of globally oriented finance and industrial 
capital (Van Apeldoorn 2001). In brief, this study con-
siders class agency within and across nations to be the 
central analytical category and thus as bringing about 
the transformations described.
However, in an attempt to overcome the reductionist 
and economicist trends in Marxist political economy, 
a neo-Gramscian approach stresses the fundamental 
discursive dimension of class agency and power. Thus, 
ideas and discourses are not simply complementary as-
pects to be added on in an ad-hoc fashion to the analy-
sis; they are constitutive of our world, they contribute to 
the very production and reproduction of capitalist so-
cial relations and of the wider historical structures. His-
torical structures (a particular configuration of power in 
the dimension of ideas, material capabilities and institu-
tions) are not seen as determining the actors’ choices 
but as influencing them (Cox 1981). This frames a dia-
lectical relation between agencies in structures that 
is well summed-up by Marx’ oft-quoted phrase: “men 
make their own history, but they do not make it as 
they please; they do not make it under circumstances 
of their own choosing, but under circumstances exist-
ing already, given and transmitted from the past” (Marx 
1963 p.15). Every social force aims at making its view 
of the world the dominant one, thus creating ‘limits of 
the possible’ in political terms that condition the way 
people and classes can understand their social world 
and the possibilities for change. Ideas, in this concep-
tualisation, have a material structure (Bieler 2001). Thus, 
one must conceive the logic of action as constituted 
by both material interests and ideas as inseparable ele-
ments of human agency and historical transformation. 
It is precisely the role of ‘organic intellectuals’ to develop 
ideas that create a framework of thought for the social 
force they are the expression of.  
Critical theory differs from problem-solving theory on-
tologically, epistemologically and methodologically 
(see Cox 1981 for the classic argument). Adopting a 
critical theory approach, the article will not formulate 
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or test hypotheses here. This work is conceived as an 
instance of a descriptive interpretive case study. The lat-
ter “interprets or explains an event by applying a known 
theory to the new terrain. (…) Although this method 
may not test a theory, the case study shows that one or 
more known theories can be extended to account for 
a new event” (Odell 2001: 163). My aim is to apply Gill’s 
theoretical concept of ‘new constitutionalism’ to a new 
case: post-reform European Union.  The empirical mate-
rial used includes documents of EU institutions acces-
sible through the official websites, as well as legislative 
proposals and a variety of academic and journalistic 
commentary. 
The article is divided into five parts. It begins by provid-
ing a historical reflection on the relationship between 
capitalism and democracy within neo-liberalism. It 
then presents Gill’s notion of ‘new constitutionalism’ 
and briefly engages with alternative theories of Euro-
pean integration, as well as with the critiques of ‘new 
constitutionalism’ that have been advanced within criti-
cal political economy itself. Parts three and four are de-
voted respectively to a description and an analysis of 
the reforms enacted. The fifth part reviews the origins 
and consequences of the economic and financial crisis 
in the Eurozone.
The de-politicisation of ‘the 
economy’
In the post-war years, there was a widely held assump-
tion that for capitalism to be compatible with democra-
cy, it needed to be subjected to extensive political con-
trol. This was the golden era of the welfare state, what in 
France was known as the trente glorieuses of economic 
growth, rising standard of living for everyone and the 
creation of effective mechanisms of social protection. 
Liberalism incorporated the welfare state concept and 
thus recognised the power asymmetries that constitute 
‘the market’, in turn legitimizing public intervention to 
guarantee social rights and entitlements following Po-
lanyi’s logic of ‘social protection’ (Polanyi 1957). 
Since then, mainstream economics has however slowly 
but systematically aimed at undermining the idea of 
public intervention in the ‘economy’, and has become 
“obsessed with the irresponsibility of opportunistic 
politicians who cater to an economically uneducated 
electorate by interfering with otherwise efficient mar-
kets, in pursuit of objectives – such as full employment 
and social justice – that truly free markets would in the 
long run deliver anyway but must fail to deliver when 
distorted by politics” (Streeck 2011:6). In fact, econom-
ics as a discipline has arguably been an important 
vector in the advancement of neoliberalism, as neo-
classical theory provides a micro-economic theory set 
against the state’s intervention in the economy. It has 
become what Marx called a ‘material force’. In Van der 
Pijl’s  (2006a: 160) words:
As economics, neoliberalism enshrines capital 
as the sovereign force in organising society. The 
sole agencies that it explicitly recognises are the 
property-owning individual, who is ‘free’ to en-
gage in a competitive quest for improvement; 
and the market, which is the regulator of that 
quest. Capital, as the mobile wealth that has 
already accumulated and has entrenched itself 
politically, is obscured as a social force by res-
urrecting an imagined universe of individuals, 
some of whom happen to own Microsoft and 
other only their labour, or not even that. Neo-
liberalism thus naturalises capitalist relations by 
taking the economic definition of man as the 
starting point for an integral social science while 
leaving outcomes entirely contingent. 
The social and economic crisis of 1970s was interpreted 
by the authors of the famous essay The Crisis of Democ-
racy as stemming precisely from an excess of democ-
racy. From democracy being carried over and invading 
the sphere of the economy, where it should not adven-
ture itself (Crozier et al. 1975). The solution advanced 
was that microeconomic rationality should be restored 
to the individual’s choices. ‘Discretionary’ political inter-
ference into the economy should be avoided. 
Thus, by resurrecting the idea of ‘the market’ – the term 
‘market economy’ gradually substituted the term ‘capi-
talism’ – as the regulator of each individual’s freedom 
and capacity, capital is effectively hidden as a social 
force which acts within the market sphere, and what is 
instead promoted is the idea of a ‘neutral’ sphere regu-
lating the merits and life-chances of individuals.
The trends described above have arguably been exac-
erbated by a situation of crisis, which – as the neoliberal 
economist Friedman himself remarked (Friedman 2002: 
300) –  is often a productive moment for the introduc-
tion of radical reforms. The dominant narration reflects 
a de-politicised naturalisation of the crisis. Thus, the 
new regulatory measures are, as Zizek points out, “pre-
sented not as decisions grounded in political choices 
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but as the imperatives of a neutral financial logic – if 
we want our economies to stabilise, we simply have to 
swallow the bitter pill” (Zizek 2011: 85). 
‘New Constitutionalism’: 
bracketing ‘the economy’
One of the main elements of neoliberal governance, 
theorised by Stephen Gill, is what has been termed 
‘new constitutionalism’. It consists of a tendency to 
insulate significant aspects of economic policy from 
popular-democratic accountability, and subordinating 
them to technocratic management. In Gill’s words, we 
are witnessing the “imposition of new constitutional 
and quasi-constitutional political and legal frameworks 
– with respect to the state and the operation of strate-
gic, macroeconomic, microeconomic and social policy” 
(Gill 2000). This process entails the proliferation of con-
stitutionally guaranteed arrangements for macroeco-
nomic policies, such as the creation of independent 
central banks and of balanced budget laws, leading to a 
form of ‘sanitised democracy’ (van der Pijl 2006b). In es-
sence, new constitutionalism enshrines, in Gill’s words, 
“the discipline of capital in social relations”, that is the 
“politico-legal dimension of the wider discourse of neo-
liberalism” (Gill 2000:47) and makes alternative models 
of development more difficult to bring about demo-
cratically (Gill 2012).
Within the EU framework since Maastricht, several ele-
ments signal the move towards a ‘new constitutionalist’ 
settlement (the following is partly based on Gill 2001). 
First, the institutionalisation of strict fiscal discipline in 
order to make governments more ‘credible’ to inves-
tors and de-socialise risk provision through the welfare 
state. Second, the management of the monetary policy 
by the European Central Bank (ECB) since the modifi-
cation of its status would require the agreement of all 
national parliaments. Moreover, its main task is to fight 
inflation, with other goals being subordinated to this 
objective. Third, the creation of the Single European 
Market based on the constitutionalisation of market 
freedoms (the four freedoms) within the EU that makes 
it more difficult for member states to implement de-
mand management or public intervention policies. For 
instance, competition policy and the rules of the inter-
nal market are guarded by the European Commission 
and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Fourth, the 
unelected Commission has the exclusive power of leg-
islative initiative, and within a relatively broad mandate 
laid down by member states, exercises day-to-day con-
trol over external trade. In addition, the development 
of a ‘juridical Europe’ (Holman and van der Pijl 2003), 
spurred by the constitutionalisation of the internal mar-
ket with its four freedoms, has increased the power of 
the ECJ on socio-economic governance, thus further-
ing its insulation from democratic control.  Moreover, as 
Van Apeldoorn (2000) has argued, EU-level labour mar-
ket and social policies have been framed within a ‘new 
competitiveness discourse’ sponsored by transnational 
business organisations such as the European Roundta-
ble of Industrialists.
The general outcome is that, within the framework of 
EMU, governments become more responsive to the 
discipline of transnational market forces, expressed in 
the need to maintain freedom for capitals, low inflation 
and low corporate taxes, to balance national budgets 
and keep public spending under control, while deregu-
lating the labour market (Gill 2009). Thus, “public policy 
has been redefined in such a way that governments 
seek to prove their credibility” to capital, their policies 
judged “according to the degree to which they inspire 
the confidence of investors” (Gill 2000: 47). 
Van der Pijl (2006b: 29) usefully sums up the thrust of the 
‘new constitutionalist’ framework. He argues that “just 
as economic competitors are not supposed to chal-
lenge the nature of the market economy itself (which 
is why the state has to be separate from the economy 
and refrain from taking on any activity which private 
subjects can handle), the participants in the democratic 
competition must accept the ‘level playing field’, that is 
the existing socio-political order”.  Thus, the bounda-
ries of the ‘political’ and the ‘economic’ realms are rede-
signed in order to lessen short-run political pressures 
on the formulation of economic policy so that many re-
distributive policies, let alone a radical change in socio-
economic policy, are rendered more difficult, or even 
illegal (it could even be argued that ‘inequality’ cannot 
become an election issue).
Mainstream integration theories are largely unable to 
account for such changes as they focus on the form 
rather than the content of European integration. Ne-
glecting the capitalist nature of the European polity, 
which is embedded in a world capitalist totality, main-
stream theories also lack the conceptual tools to ana-
lyse the social content and social purpose of the recent 
phase of integration.  Behind mainstream theories of 
European integration there is an unspoken assumption 
that “market forces are expressions of an inner ration-
ality of universal human nature that is held to be the 
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essence of the realm of freedom in political affairs” (van 
Apeldoorn, Overbeek and Ryner 2003: 17-18). A critical 
political economy approach – grounded in a Marxist-
Gramscian perspective – on the other hand, by focus-
ing on the social power constitutive of a ‘market econ-
omy’, stresses the embedding of institutions into wider 
historical structures (Cox 1981), which are produced 
and reproduced through class struggle and hegemony. 
In extreme synthesis, within a historicist perspective, 
what is refused is also the idea that human freedom has 
found its ultimate realisation in liberal political institu-
tions (Bobbio 1955). 
Neofunctionalism (the classic reference here is Haas 
1968) and intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1991, 1993; 
Milward 2000), as well as recent attempts to modify the 
theories to respond to critiques and take into account 
new developments (Sandholz and Zysman 1989 and 
Moravcsik 1998) all adopt utilitarian and individualist 
assumptions that are not able to understand the nature 
of social power relations, grounded as they are in the 
asymmetries generated by the mode of production. In 
these accounts, power as such is seen as the realm of 
the state or of supranational institutions, while civil so-
ciety is viewed as the sphere of freedom, of free interac-
tions among human beings. Neo-functionalist analyses 
could argue that the pooling of decision-making power 
on fiscal policy in the recent reforms (see below) is the 
outcome of a ‘spillover effect’ in times of crisis. However, 
they would be unable to grasp the fundamental social 
purpose that lies behind these reforms, as they lack the 
instruments to conceptualise social power as such, and 
thus to contextualise the shifting boundaries between 
‘the market’ and democratic participation.
Multilevel governance theory (see Hix  1999) goes be-
yond previous approaches by looking at the EU as a 
sui generis political system that can be analysed with 
the tools of comparative politics. However, as van Apel-
doorn, Overbeek and Ryner point out (2001: 26-29), 
such approach can be subjected to the critique that the 
Marxists advanced to pluralist political science in the 
1960s. The thrust of the argument was that the com-
petition among interest groups within a state does not 
take place on equal terms, as the very structure of capi-
talism makes the state much more responsive to capi-
tal’s interests. For instance, the state’s dependence on 
state revenue and on the investment decisions of firms 
makes state policy skewed towards meeting the valori-
sation goals of capital rather than other objectives. 
Within critical political economy, critiques that point 
to weaknesses in the concept of ‘new constitutional-
ism’ have been advanced. Bruff (2010) ha argued that 
the concept, together with the whole approach of 
‘transnational historical materialism’, suffers from the 
assumption of institutional isomorphism: “the implicit 
argument is that this transformative project, once for-
mulated at the European level, is able to penetrate the 
member states in a uniform manner because the na-
tional units fall into line what the supranational unit dic-
tates” (Ibidem: 618). He points out that by subsuming 
the ‘national’ into the ‘transnational’, any change in the 
national political economies is seen as caused by the 
entrenchment of neoliberalism at EU level by transna-
tional capital, and that this stance neglects the ‘national’ 
as a focus of analysis: “the impression that once gets – 
despite what the intentions may have been – is that na-
tional capitalisms are little more than functional to the 
interests of transnational capital as expressed through 
the EU’s institutional architecture” (Ibidem: 619). This cri-
tique then warrants – according to the author – the de-
velopment of a theory that analyses the national while 
remaining aware of the conditioning of the internation-
al.  Strange (2006) has also advanced a critique of ‘new 
constitutionalism’, arguing that Gill neglects the politi-
cally contested nature of the concept of constitution-
alism and thus adopts a determinist approach arguing 
that the single currency project is to be equated une-
quivocally with monetarism and neoliberalism: “for the 
new constitutionalists, European integration and the 
Euro (are) simply attempts by the transnational elite to 
consolidate economic globalisation politically” (Ibidem: 
214); “Despite its explicit analytical emphasis on agency 
(especially the transnational global elite), new constitu-
tionalism is substantively structuralist in its understand-
ing of the relationship between the (structurally domi-
nant) transnational capital, (facilitating) EU governance 
and (structurally dominated) broadly progressive/social 
democratic interests”(Ibidem: 226).
The point, however, is that ‘new constitutionalism’ is 
not an all-encompassing concept that describes the 
framework within which socio-economic policy is car-
ried out and that completely subsumes the national 
unit. It is – in interpretation adopted by in this article – a 
tendency that is operative within neoliberalism, and as 
any form of political and social struggle, it is prone to 
counter-tendencies and resistance that are operative 
also at the national level. In both Van Apeldoorn’s and 
Gill’s analyses there is attention to forms of agency.  The 
framework that was devised at Maastricht, for instance, 
is not seen as purely neoliberal, as it is the outcome of a 
skewed compromise between alternative political pro-
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jects for European integration, with the predominance 
of the neoliberal project (see Van Apeldoorn 2002). 
Thus, there are elements of social policy at European 
level, and fiscal transfers in the form of structural and 
regional funds do play a role. There are also channels 
for democratic accountability. The Commission is not 
entirely insulated from democratic control, as commis-
sioners are nominated by the president in accordance 
with member states. The parliament does have a role to 
play in an increasing number of areas of policy-making 
at the European level. However, the general trend has 
been towards the limitation of popular-democratic ac-
countability, as noted above. 
According to Van Apeldoorn, since Maastricht, the EU 
witnessed the rise of an ‘embedded neoliberal’ he-
gemony in which European socio-economic govern-
ance subordinates member states to the interests of 
global transnational capital, at the same time commit-
ting itself to limited elements of ‘embeddedness’ (in the 
Polanyian sense) that are however almost exclusively 
rooted in national institutional frameworks (van Apel-
doorn 2002). The author has also focused (2009) on 
the increasingly relevant problems of legitimacy of the 
European neoliberal project at the national level, thus 
incorporating an analysis of the different national class 
compromises within the European ‘new constitutional-
ist’ settlement. Accordingly, it is the national state that 
must guarantee welfare state entitlements in the face 
of European constraints. Moreover, Gill himself never 
argues – contra Strange – that a single currency is to be 
equated with neoliberalism. In fact, he acknowledges 
the possibility of devising alternative forms of monetary 
and political union that are based on alternative social 
forces and political projects (Gill 2001 pp.61-69). There 
is therefore no neglect of the national dimension and of 
the contested nature of ‘new constitutionalism’ and no 
structural determinism at work.
“A silent revolution”
Recent reforms of the Stability and growth pact (SGP) 
and economic governance in the EU and in the Euro-
zone in particular have been defined by President of 
the European Commission Barroso as a ‘silent revolu-
tion’ (Corporate Europe Observatory 2011: 2). 
At the beginning of October 2011, the Council has 
agreed upon a package of six legislative proposals on 
economic governance, the so-called “six-pack”, explic-
itly designed in order to strengthen “economic govern-
ance in the EU – and more specifically in the Euro area 
– as part of the EU’s response to the current turmoil on 
sovereign debt markets” (Council of the EU 2011). These 
reforms make the SGP stronger in both the prevention 
and enforcement stages. The public deficit and public 
debt criteria are placed on equal footing for the first 
time, and a new voting procedure (‘reverse qualified 
majority’ voting) has been adopted. 
 The reforms have concerned how fiscal and eco-
nomic policies are conducted in the EU member states. 
The innovations put in place can be broadly divided in 
two main areas: the new economic governance proce-
dures and the initiatives taken apparently outside the 
formal institutional framework of the EU: the so-called 
Europe 2020 initiative and the Euro plus pact.1 As will be 
shown, these two innovations are tightly linked and to-
gether constitute the new framework for dealing with 
socio-economic governance in the EU.
The changes to the ‘economic governance’ of the EU 
introduced with the so-called ‘Six-pack’ are essentially 
three (see: EU press release 2011a; Council of the EU 
2011):
1. Stronger preventive arm. With regards to 
the SGP, each member state is assigned a me-
dium-term budgetary objective (MTO) setting 
limits to expenditure growth, which should not 
exceed the medium-term GDP growth rate. 
Each member state commits itself to a Stabil-
ity or Convergence Programme (SCP), includ-
ing the structural reforms needed to achieve 
fiscal sustainability. If the member state fails to 
respect the programme, an enforcement proce-
dure is activated which can lead to a sanction in 
the form of an interest-bearing deposit amount-
ing to 0.2 percent of GDP (for Eurozone states), 
which can later be turned into a fine. It is impor-
tant to note that the final decision can be taken 
by the Council following the so-called ‘reverse 
majority’ voting procedure (meaning that it will 
be adopted unless a simple majority of member 
states votes against it). This marks an important 
innovation, as to date countries could be pun-
ished only if a qualified majority of Eurozone 
countries voted to approve. The latter proce-
dure has been a recent innovation and does not 
seem to have a secure legal basis in the treaties 
(Waterfeld 2011).
2. The excessive deficit procedure (EDP). This 
implements the obligations for member states 
1 See: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm. See 
also: EU press release 2011b.
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to keep deficits below 3 percent and govern-
ment debt below or sufficiently declining to-
wards 60 percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP). The corrective part of the SGP is strength-
ened by imposing stricter rules and through 
better enforcement. Regarding the stricter rules, 
it will now be possible to open an EDP on the 
basis of the debt criterion: “member states with 
government debt ratios in excess of 60 percent 
of GDP should reduce this ratio in line with a 
numerical benchmark, which implies a decline 
of the amount by which their debt exceeds the 
threshold at a rate in the order of 1/20th per 
year over three years” (EU press release 2011a). 
If they do not, the country can be placed in an 
EDP. Crucially, also in this case the sanction (in 
the form of a non-interest bearing deposit of 0.2 
percent of GDP) can be activated following the 
‘reverse majority’ voting procedure. This deposit 
can then be turned into a fine in case of non-
compliance, and extended – in the case of fur-
ther non-compliance – to up to 0.5 percent of 
GDP.
3. The policing of so-called ‘major macroeco-
nomic imbalances’. The latter are judged accord-
ing to a ‘scoreboard’ of around 10 indicators of 
macroeconomic imbalance, whose content is 
left unclear: “the composition of indicators may 
evolve over time. Thresholds will be identified 
and announced” (EU press release 2011b). If 
there is an imbalance – or if there is risk of the 
emergence of an imbalance  - in a state which 
fails to implement the necessary corrective ac-
tion plan, there is a semi-automatic decision 
making procedure (all the decisions in the pro-
cedure are taken by the ‘reverse majority’ voting 
procedure) which leads to a sanction and the 
potential fine of 0.1 percent of GDP. 
The process is initiated by the adoption on the part of 
the Council of the Commission’s proposal for the An-
nual Growth Survey of the Union, on the basis of which 
the member states draft their SCPs. The latter are then 
assessed by the Commission and approved by the 
Council in July. It is remarked that “draft budgets will 
continue to be sent from governments to national 
parliaments for debate in the second half of the year, 
since they continue to exercise fully their right to de-
cide on the budget” (Ibidem). Throughout the year, the 
economic and fiscal policies of the member states will 
be surveilled on the basis of the recommendations, “in-
cluding consideration of possible further/enforcement 
measures (Excessive Deficit Procedure/Excessive Imbal-
ance Procedure)” (Ibidem). 
The second wider area of intervention, which is strictly 
related to the first and partly uses the same procedures, 
incorporates the Europe2020 strategy and the Euro 
Plus Pact.   The Europe 2020 strategy is the EU’s com-
mon economic agenda. It sets out priorities and targets 
at the EU and national level in order to achieve – in a 
way akin to the failed Lisbon strategy of 2000 – “smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth over the next 10 years” 
(Ibidem). Apart from the targets proposed, which often 
simply re-formulate the Lisbon strategy targets  2, the 
strategy also points to three priorities to guarantee 
macro-economic stability: 1.Putting public finances 
in order; 2. Taking action where there are large cur-
rent account deficits or surpluses and 3. Ensuring the 
stability of the financial sector. Four further priorities 
are highlighted in order to “enhance structural reform: 
1. Helping people get back to work or find new jobs 
by making work more financially attractive; 2.urgently 
reforming pension systems; 3.making sure that unem-
ployment benefits provide an incentive to work and 
4.better balancing flexibility and security in the labour 
market” (Ibidem).  
Moreover, another group of EU member states has 
signed the so-called Euro plus pact. The pact commits 
the signatories to implement reforms in four areas: 
competitiveness, employment, sustainability of public 
finances and reinforcing financial stability. The Pact is 
embedded in the new ‘economic governance’ frame-
work described above, and the commitments are in-
cluded in the so-called National Reform Programmes 
(NRPs) of the member states. The SCPs indicate the 
measures – to be translated into concrete policy ac-
tions – that each state intends to take domestically to 
contribute to what has been decided at the EU level 
(with the annual growth survey). The Euro plus pact 
also strengthens the preventive arm of the SGP, as it 
commits member states to translating EU fiscal rules 
as set out in the SGP into national frameworks through 
a national legal vehicle of their choice. However, “this 
should have a sufficiently binding and durable nature 
2 Seventy-five percent of the population between 20-64 
is estimated  to be employed; three percent of the EU’s GDP to 
be invested in Research and Development; CO2 emissions to be 
reduced by 20 percent; The share of early school leavers to be less 
than 10 percent and at least 40 percent of the younger generation 
should have a degree or diploma; 20 million fewer people at the 
risk of poverty
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(e.g. a constitutional or framework law)” (EU press re-
lease 2001b), with the intention of, in the words of EU 
Commission for Economic and Financial Affairs, to “en-
shrine a balanced budget in the constitution” (EU press 
release 2001c). This latter goal is particularly important 
and has been repeated in, for instance, the recent letter 
that the European Commission has sent to the former 
Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi (La Repubblica 2011a).
Making sense of ‘economic 
governance’
Thus, the innovations are basically three. Let us first an-
alyse the procedure to correct ‘macroeconomic imbal-
ances’. The ambiguity of the ‘scoreboard’ for judging the 
‘macroeconomic imbalances’ allows the Commission to 
touch upon fiscal policy, including taxation and spend-
ing, labour policy, the composition of debt and influ-
ences even domestic decisions such as the allocation 
of resources between sectors, and levels of consump-
tion. Even decisions on wages and budgets can serve 
as benchmarks and be touched upon at EU level (Cor-
porate Europe Observatory 2011: 6; Phillips 2011a).  As 
clearly remarked, recommendations for member states 
can include both revenue and expenditure sides of fis-
cal policy and labour and goods markets. As one com-
mentator put it, “it provides a leeway for demands for 
lower wages and for cuts in welfare” (Corporate Europe 
Observatory 2011: 7). Others have argued that it is prac-
tically an “open door to influencing all areas of national 
economic policy” (Vassalos et al. 2011).
Regarding the Europe 2020 strategy, the reforms are 
arguably more influenced by neoliberal economic 
thinking than even the 2000 Lisbon goals. In fact, the 
emphasis on ‘getting people back to work’ instead of 
creating useful and stable jobs says a lot about the 
extent to which socio-economic policy-making and 
thinking has abandoned the traditional ‘de-commodi-
fying’ goals of European welfare states (Esping-Anders-
en 1990). What is also enhanced – although not new 
(Gray 2004; Bradanini 2009) - is the switch from a ‘right 
to work’ to a ‘duty to work’ discourse and practice, with 
the corresponding framing of the market as the regula-
tor of each individual’s competitive quest, and thus as a 
natural condition, as the ‘realm of freedom’ in human af-
fairs, in contrast to a social-democratic or welfare-state 
conceptualisation of the market as a sphere of conflict, 
which must be regulated (through market-correcting 
measures, and not the current market-enabling social 
policies) (Jessop 2003). The way competitiveness is 
framed within the Europe 2020 strategy is clearly in the 
direction of more flexible labour markets, cutting public 
pensions and liberalising or privatising public services. 
For instance, the fact that competitiveness will be eval-
uated by the national unit labour costs (ULC) implies a 
pro-capital stance. In addition, it has been highlighted 
that labour costs are to be reduced by reforming the 
“degree of centralisation in the bargaining process, the 
indexation mechanism” (Council of the EU conclusions 
2011) and reduce wages in the public sector. Productiv-
ity is to be achieved mostly by “deregulating industry” 
(Council of the EU conclusions 2011). 
Among the policy suggestions, worth mentioning 
is also the classic neoliberal policy advice to increase 
productivity by “further opening of sheltered sectors 
to remove restrictions on professional services, to fos-
ter competition and efficiency, … improve business 
environment, … increasing pension age, limiting early 
retirement schemes” (Council of the EU conclusions 
2011). Although these are not compulsory policies, as 
the commitments involve the goals to be achieved, 
the documents produced stress that these issues men-
tioned above will be given particular attention both in 
the recommendations and in the NRPs and SCPs men-
tioned above (Council of the EU conclusions 2011).
The innovations regarding the SGP have a significant 
influence on national economic policy. We have seen 
that if a country has not committed a budget to the 
scrutiny of the Commission before its parliament has 
seen it or is too slow in reducing debt or deficit, then 
the Commission can demand a financial guarantee it 
won’t give back unless the government changes policy, 
or impose a fine. So, although formally the national par-
liament continues to have the last word on the budget, 
it is easy to see that the new economic governance 
framework strongly constrains the room of manoeuvre 
set to it, lest it face sanctions and fines for years (if it 
wants to adopt different economic and fiscal policies).
One of the main jobs of the government is precisely to 
produce a budget, and the power of the parliament in 
budgetary matters has traditionally been at the root of Eu-
ropean democracy. Now, the democratically elected rep-
resentatives of the people can have a look at the budget 
and vote on it only after the EU institutions have judged 
them (or have imposed a fine). Susan George calls this a 
coup d’état, coupled with the moral dimension that has 
been dominating the debate in public opinion, which is 
centred on the idea that ‘you cannot live beyond your 
means’ (Vassalos et al 2011; George 2011).
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We can thus see that there is an underlying economic 
logic unifying what EU commissioner for Economic 
and Financial Affairs Olli Rehn calls a “quantum leap of 
economic surveillance in Europe” (Phillips 2011a). Wage 
restraint, the reduction of social expenditure, competi-
tiveness and fiscal sustainability are the wider goals to 
be achieved. What can be called a “permanent structur-
al adjustment programme” is being implemented in the 
EU. As can be clearly seen, the issues that are dealt with 
in this new economic governance framework are and 
have been the object of political, social and class strug-
gle for decades. Here they are viewed simply as subjects 
of debates among EU decision-makers, most of whom 
unaccountable to voters. This is highly problematic in 
terms of democratic legitimacy (Schmidt 2010) and is 
bound to generate resentment and disaffection (not 
least for the idea of democracy) among the electorate. 
Whose Europe? Whose Crisis? 
The current economic recession has been interpreted 
as a crisis of capital overaccumulation and profitability 
that has its origins in the 1970s (Callinicos 2010; Foster 
and Magdoff 2009). During the two-three decades be-
fore the financial crash, capitalism has been reproduc-
ing itself accumulating an enormous amount of debt. To 
avoid the collapse of the system, the states have taken 
over that debt, effectively privatizing public spending, 
thus transferring them from the private to the public 
sector. Now, the bill is presented to the majority of the 
citizens, who are forced to accept cuts in salaries, social 
spending and an increasing privatisation and liberalisa-
tion of the economies.
Moving from this abstract level of analysis to the actual 
concrete unfolding of the crisis, one can see that the 
economic crisis has exposed the long-standing prob-
lems of the Eurozone to strain and is now putting at risk 
the very existence of the common currency. While the 
monetary union had achieved the goals of eliminating 
currency fluctuations and interest rate differentials, it 
has done so only by shifting the problem elsewhere, 
namely in the difference in wage-setting mechanisms 
and wage levels. Exchange rates can no longer be used 
to counter economic differences within the Eurozone. 
Hence,
if a deterioration in relative (unit) costs cannot be 
reversed by productivity improvements, unions 
in affected areas will be pressed to accept nomi-
nal wage reductions or low increases as well 
as cuts in nonwage costs, eroding bargained 
statutory social benefits. This may happen even 
without asymmetric shocks, insofar as employ-
ers (and governments) seek price advantages, 
no longer attainable by currency depreciation, 
through wage and benefit cuts instead (Martin 
and Ross 1999: 70)
What this stance implies is that the policy prescriptions 
produced by EU institutions for adaptation tended to 
include supply-side and market-enhancing policies 
such as liberalisation and deregulation. These were and 
are highly politically salient measures. The current re-
forms of economic governance - on which few if any 
national parliaments had a say  (Vassalos et al 2011) – 
make these pressures for reform more stringent, as they 
are now linked with the possibility of sanctions and 
fines. Altvater summarises in this way the constraints 
imposed on member states of the EU:
Within the Eurozone the expense side of gov-
ernment deficits is tightly regulated by the 
Maastricht criteria, even if the budgetary impact 
of the financial crisis has been to disrupt signifi-
cantly the guidelines. The revenue side, on the 
other hand, is subject to regulatory arbitrage in 
favour of investors. Limiting wealth taxes frees 
up money wealth that is in turn used for specu-
lation in financial markets (Altvater 2011).
In short, only wage restraint or government spending 
can vary in order to adjust the ‘real’ economies in the 
single currency area. What this means is a permanent 
pressure on workers and their organisation to adjust to 
the need for competitiveness. However, this effect ma-
terialised in a differentiated way across the Eurozone, 
fuelling the increase of private debt. What happened 
was that the imposition of a one-size-fits-all monetary 
policy in the Eurozone produced asymmetric dynam-
ics in EMU economies. For low-growth countries, the 
ECB rates were too high, and viceversa for high-growth 
economies. In Germany, wage levels were effectively 
curtailed, thus inflation levels were maintained at very 
low levels. This economic slowdown in Germany in turn 
was effectively overcome through supply-side meas-
ures (the Schroeder reforms, for instance) that further 
constrained domestic demand and increased export 
competitiveness. This is another way of saying that Ger-
man capital had found a way to permanently contain 
the wage demands of labour and thus acquire compet-
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itiveness (in Marxian terms, increase relative surplus val-
ue). Here, the real interest rates were much higher than 
in the rest of the Eurozone. In the periphery, and in par-
ticular in the so-called PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, 
and Spain) economies, high growth fuelled wage lev-
els increases, in turn increasing inflation and thus low-
ering real interest rates. This caused a credit-financed 
economic growth that tended to generate speculative 
bubbles (as in Spain and Ireland). In this way, Germany 
increased exports and reduced imports, and export 
earnings were then profitably invested in peripheral 
economies, not for production but for speculation in 
real estate. The latter economies thus had an availabil-
ity of cheap capital, also attracted by low interest rates. 
In short, the current account surplus of Germany was fi-
nancing the current account deficits and growth of the 
peripheral countries (De Grauwe 2010a). Apart from the 
current account deficits, debts accumulated domesti-
cally in the periphery also as the banks took advantage 
of the homogeneous European money market to ex-
pand their credit operations (Lapavitsas 2011: 289). In 
fact, the public debt/GDP ratio of countries like Spain 
and Ireland was significantly lower than Germany, and 
in the 2000s they even maintained surpluses of the 
budget. 
Relative wages in peripheral countries increased more 
than in Germany and this witnessed the largest slump in 
wages in Europe (Corporate Europe Observatory 2011: 
12) – although there has been a general downward 
pressure on wages. In fact, even the fastest growing 
wages in the Eurozone, the Greek salaries, failed to keep 
pace with productivity growth (Flassback 2011). Hence, 
there is no folly, or greed by ‘irresponsible’ workers here. 
In fact,  “it is not wage increases on the periphery per se 
which cost jobs in Greece and other poorer Eurozone 
countries…but the success of the German bourgeoi-
sie in keeping down wages at home” (McGiffen 2011: 
31; Scharpf 2011: 6-7). For instance, unit labour costs in 
Greece were 130 in 2010 if 2000 is 100, while the corre-
sponding figure for Germany was 105 (Flassback 2011).
According to the economist De Grauwe, the root cause 
of the sovereign debt crisis is precisely the accumula-
tion of debt in the private sectors of the economy (De 
Grauwe 2010a). The public debts reached high levels 
only after the economic crisis (in fact EU government 
debts fell from an average of 72 percent in 1999 to 66 
percent in 2007). 
In fact, De Grauwe explicitly blames the European 
monetary authorities for these imbalances, because 
“bank credit is a more proximate cause of the bubbles 
and booms” and monetary authorities have the power 
to control bank credit by, for instance, setting up dif-
ferentiated deposit requirements and the growth of 
bank credit. (De Grauwe 2010a: 8).  However, in no offi-
cial document there is any acknowledgment of the fact 
that the monetary policy of the ECB played a role in the 
crisis. What is implied is that member states have to deal 
with the imbalances produced by a common monetary 
policy by using their policy instruments, which however 
have been strongly limited by the Commission’s inter-
ventions, for instance with the EDP. This phenomenon 
can be seen as a further instance of the mechanism of 
‘embedded neoliberalism’, with its EU-level disembed-
ding processes that constrain the member states’ abil-
ity to continue providing elements of social protection 
(van Apeldoorn 2002).
The European response to the sovereign debt crisis was 
to approve a series of rescue packages conditional on 
the implementation of austerity measures. However, as 
many point out, such measures may in fact exacerbate 
the vicious circle of low growth – austerity – debt (Vas-
salos et al 2011; Lapavitsas 2011; Callinicos 2011). The 
recessionary impact of the austerity measures imposed 
by the EU makes it unlikely that the public deficits can 
be reduced (Altvater 2011: 273-274). 
On the other hand, what these measures have done 
and are doing is constituting a wide market-enhancing 
‘structural reform’ that is weakening unions, privatising 
and liberalising public services and professions and 
opening up education and health care to private pro-
viders. The structural power of capital is due to increase 
significantly, turning many European political econo-
mies from ‘Social Market Economies’ to ‘Liberal Market 
Economies’ (Scharpf 2009) perhaps confirming that we 
are going through a crisis in neoliberalism, instead of a 
crisis of neoliberalism (Saad-Filho 2010). Whatever the 
ultimate outcome of the Eurozone crisis surplus coun-
tries’ capital is due to benefit from the ability to acquire 
peripheral countries’ productive assets at reduced costs, 
thus enhancing the centralisation of capital (Brancaccio 
and Passarella 2012) and the power of German capital 
(Van der Pijl et al. 2011; Cesaratto 2011).
In addition, another serious problem is the fact that the 
ECB is the only central bank in the world that does not 
lend to governments but to banks. These banks, which 
borrow money from the ECB at low interest rates, then 
buy government debt neatly pocketing the profits. In 
fact, as long as a country is not defaulting the high-risk 
premiums are a formidable source of profits for banks. 
The rescue plans pour credit that is then handed down 
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to the banks. And government austerity plans ensure 
that in the end it is the citizens who transfer an increas-
ing part of their income to private banks. 
Moreover, as Husson notes, since the crisis,
the European governments and the European 
Commission have had one overriding goal: busi-
ness as usual. This goal is however out of reach 
because everything that had helped manage 
the contradictions of the flawed form of Euro-
pean integration such as peripheral Europe’s 
indebtedness and internal Europe’s’ trade imbal-
ances, has been rendered unusable by the crisis 
(Husson 2011: 300).
 The era of cheap credit is over. Peripheral countries will 
not have access to cheap borrowing from abroad to 
ease the pressures of monetary union because of the 
credit crunch. Perhaps we will effectively enter a period 
in which, as Zizek notes, a kind of economic emergency 
is becoming permanent, turning into a constant, a way 
of life (Zizek 2011).
The situation being developed is increasingly one of 
“politics without policies at national level, policies with-
out politics at European level” (Bailey 2008). In turn, this 
creates a situation where economic power is perceived 
to have become political power, generating a condition 
of subalternity of workers and citizens, who are largely 
unable to project onto the political economy interests 
and demands that are incompatible with those of capi-
tal owners, that are increasingly constitutionalised at 
the European level. As Phillips rhetorically asks himself, 
“if a government doesn’t control monetary policy any-
more, and doesn’t control fiscal policy anymore, what’s 
left for a government to do? That’s about all they do, 
other than foreign and judicial policy” (Phillips 2011b). 
Perhaps one should go back to the famous argument 
advanced by philosopher Carl Schmitt: the sovereign is 
he who rules in the state of exception. And ask himself: 
who is it that ‘rules’ at the moment in Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal?  
But what are the historical and social origins of ‘new 
consitutionalist’ neoliberal arrangements?  
Conclusion
This article have proposed a reading of the recent Euro-
pean economic governance reforms by using the con-
cept of ‘new constitutionalism’. After having provided a 
short interpretation of the historical roots of neoliberal-
ism, it has described the reforms and argued that they 
have exacerbated the trend towards the insulation of 
socio-economic policies from popular-democratic con-
trol by opening new doors for technocratic governance 
insulated from electoral accountability. Although these 
arrangements are now firmly in place, the forming of 
technocratic governments insulated from the elector-
ate in some European countries, the increasing aliena-
tion of large sectors of the population from democratic 
politics3  and the rise of radical left-wing or right-wing 
parties across Europe may signal that the consensus 
is eroding and that an ‘organic crisis’ (in its Gramscian 
meaning) is mounting. However, there seems be a lack 
of credible alternatives both at the national and Euro-
pean levels, so that it is difficult to imagine a sequel of 
the European project under new auspices.
We have been witnessing forms of mass protest and 
popular insurrection where people take to the streets 
to protest against austerity measures. In countries such 
as Greece, Portugal and Ireland, having ‘new consti-
tutionalism’ eroded the possibilities of popular influ-
ence on socio-economic governance, is this the only 
form of political agency that people at the lower ends 
of the market hierarchy can have to project their inter-
est in the political economy? And, should we hope, as 
in Streeck’s provocative rhetorical question that “in the 
name of democracy we will soon have the opportunity 
to observe a few more examples?” (Streeck 2011: 28)
3 In Greece and Italy, respectively 20% and 30% of the 
population wants the country to be led by ‘experts’ (La Repubblica 
2011b).
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European Union Monitoring Mission 
in Georgia (EUMM) - a redundant mission?
SELENA STEINBACH
University of Tartu
EUMM and the war
The Russo-Georgian War in August 2008 lasted only 
a week, but the aftermath is yet to be overcome. The 
war ended with an armistice supervised by the Euro-
pean Union (EU) under France’s management. The ar-
mistice may have led to the suspension of hostilities, 
yet diplomatic rapprochement and political peace are 
still remote. The EU has been in the region since the 
war ended and has observed the implementation of 
the peace agreement in the borderland between the 
Russian Federation and the Republic of Georgia. Its in-
strument is the European Union Monitoring Mission 
(EUMM), which has been introduced in Georgia in Oc-
tober 2008, two months after the war. Interpreted in 
terms of usefulness, the EUMM contributes nothing to 
the fragile situation in Georgia and in the alleged au-
tonomies South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It is therefore 
safe to say that the EUMM is redundant. 
Sense or nonsense
Georgia is probably the country east of the EU border 
most sheltered by the EU. The European Neighborhood 
Policy (ENP), the Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Part-
nership are just some examples of European attention. 
Now, in addition, the EUMM project became part of 
Georgian political life. The sheer number of European 
projects shows the overbearing nature of the EU and 
may lead to the idea that yet another EU project seems 
pointless.  
Officially, the EUMM’s obligation is to provide a sense of 
security and to observe the sensitive situation in post-
war Georgia, in particular in the provinces most affect-
ed by the military conflict—South Ossetia and Abkha-
zia. It is an unarmed, civil mission and the monitors are 
allowed solely to objectively report incidents. Currently, 
about 200 monitors ensure that the armistice agree-
ment between Russia and Georgia is respected and 
that there are no outbreaks of violence. All this, how-
ever, might sound very peaceful and comforting, which 
is to be expected from the EU.  However, peace and 
trust cannot be achieved through monitoring in such 
a conflict-ridden region like the South Caucasus. Con-
sidering Russia’s high military presence on the borders 
with Georgia and Russian military bases in Armenia and 
its unwillingness to compromise in this matter should 
ring Europe’s alarm bells. A purely observant mission 
does little in finding a solution to this conflict.
The inefficiency of observing missions has already been 
proven in Kosovo during the Bosnian War in the 1990s. 
During and after the war, the NATO-led ‘Kosovo Force’ 
(KFOR) was accused of failure to render assistance in 
case of violent clashes and, thus, their inability to pre-
vent them. Certainly, the situations are hardly compara-
ble. Yet, there is a common ground. Both missions have 
had the aim of supervising the situation and prevent-
ing the outbreak of violence in a post-war area. In the 
case of Kosovo, KFOR was unable to do that and sub-
sequently met the aforementioned serious accusations. 
Will the mission in Georgia meet the same fate? The EU 
should not risk experiencing another similar shame. 
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Soldiers participating in the mission could and should 
have the possibility to do more. The EU has the obliga-
tion and the capabilities to turn passivity into military 
interventionist action. Its military capacity is consider-
ably high and should be used for the sake of security 
and defense of national sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and civil lives. 
Meanwhile, the EUMM claims responsibility for the pro-
gress made in the past four years. The question, howev-
er, is, whether the settlement of the conflict could have 
been reached by now if the EU had introduced a more 
powerful mission. Also, it is questionable whether it is 
really and solely due to EUMM that the situation has sta-
bilized. Moreover, it seems like there has been no pro-
gress, but instead the situation has become more pre-
carious. Russia intends stationing approximately 3 800 
soldiers in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This amounts to 
a number higher than before and during the outbreak 
of the war. In other words, Russia has increased its mili-
tary presence in the region and the EUMM was not able 
to prevent it. 
Unde"ned operational area
The EUMM could easily gain importance, if the EU fi-
nally decided on a common version of the so-called 
6-Point Agreement that assigns the EUMM mandate. 
With regard to the defined operational area, there is 
still disagreement, because the EU has failed to consent 
on a single formulation of Article 2 of the EUMM man-
date. Currently, there are three different versions—it is 
either ‘on a country-wide base’, ‘in Georgia’ or ‘through-
out Georgia’. The former High Representative for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana 
commented on this maladministration that the EU ob-
servers should be prepared to be stationed anywhere. 
His statement resembles the ambiguity of the Article 
2. Moreover, the French Foreign Ministers at that time 
Bernard Kouchner had to admit in 2008 that the origi-
nal or French version was wrongly translated into Rus-
sian. The Russian version included a different definition 
of the placement of EUMM observers. Whereas in the 
French version it said that security must be assured in 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the Russian translation 
only declared security for the regions.1  Thus, Russia as-
sumes that the EU is not necessarily granted access to 
the relevant provinces. It is needless to point out that a 
lot depends on the accurate choice of words, especially 
1 Found in: http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2008/sep/07/cease-fire-has-translation-problem/
in a conflict that perceptive. The verbalization of the 
mandate decides on Russia’s consent and on the suc-
cess of the mission. Moreover, since Russia recognized 
the sovereignty of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the 
member states of the EU have not, the conception of 
the term ‘in Georgia’ can be interpreted differently. 
Solana also declared that the operation in South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia is not agreed upon with Russia. To ignore 
the interest of Russia in this situation is not particularly 
perspicacious. To find EUMM observers in the two al-
leged ‘states’ is not in Russia’s interest, as that would in-
volve complete withdrawal of Russian troops from the 
provinces, which, in turn, Russia is not ready for. It can-
not be in the interests of the EU and the EUMM to af-
front Russia, because it could lead to a de-stabilization 
in Georgia. 
Denied access
Related to the problem of vague definition of the op-
erational area is the issue of access to the two provinc-
es. EU observers are not granted access to the de facto 
states South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Consequently, EU 
observers complain of the inability to fulfill their man-
date since they are not granted access to relevant. If the 
EUMM continued to accept the inaccessibility of the 
two provinces, they would indirectly respect the bor-
ders that are not recognized internationally. 
Russia is playing an influential role in this scenario. Rus-
sia has recognized both provinces in 2008 and, thus, 
helped pushing forward the separation of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia from the Georgian Motherland. Vladimir 
Putin in this context once said that both provinces are 
sovereign states now and can decide by themselves if 
they want external aid or not. Both governments of the 
de facto Abkhazia and South Ossetia, therefore, have to 
agree on the sending of EU monitors, but both provinc-
es/states rejected the EU monitoring mission on their 
territory. Russia is backing the governments of both 
provinces (states) with their decision of non-coopera-
tion with the EUMM, because intensifying its influence 
over the South Caucasus is in Russia’s interests. Fur-
thermore, the EU wants the complete the removal of 
Russian military personnel also from South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, which Russia wants to prevent. During Med-
vedev’s visit in Georgia in 2010 Georgia already com-
plained about Russia’s lack of willingness to cooperate 
with neither the EU nor the Georgian government. This 
issue is until today unsolved. The persistent presence of 
military of the Russian Federation violates the above-
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mentioned agreement and Russian military attendance 
is the reason for the foundation of the EUMM in the 
first place. This not only underlines the weakness of the 
EUMM, but also suggests its redundancy. 
Although the Georgian Government announces that 
it appreciates the presence of the EUMM and believes 
in the importance of the mission ensuring security and 
stability in the regions bordering Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, the security and stability in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia is what actually matters. If the EU does not 
find a way to reach the approval for operation of the 
governments of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the goal 
of the EUMM mission cannot be achieved and makes its 
foundation seem useless. 
Ideology and neutrality
The ideological concern also adds to these problems. 
The EU has its own interests to defend in the region. It 
is not neutral. In order to arbitrate between conflicting 
parties, however, one needs to be impartial. The lack of 
neutrality can be shown by the statement of Germany’s 
former Minister for Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Stein-
meier in 2008. He said that the region has enormous 
energy resources and due to the huge potential for 
co-operation, they find themselves in the focus of Euro-
pean Foreign Policy. Javier Solana, the High Represent-
ative (HR) for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security 
Policy expressed a similar notion in 2006: “The devel-
opment of a coherent and focused external EU energy 
policy, drawing on the full range of EU internal and ex-
ternal policies, would enhance the collective external 
energy security of the Union. It would also help the EU 
face more effectively possible strategies by major exter-
nal energy suppliers to adversely influence market fun-
damentals.” Solana stresses the influence of economic 
interests on EU foreign policy and this may lead to the 
conclusion that the motives behind the mission are not 
peace and political stability but rather the protection of 
economic matters. 
The countries in the South Caucasus serve as transport 
corridors and as bridge between Europe, Central Asia 
and the Middle East. The South Caucasus along with 
Russia and Central Asia is one of the most important 
oil and gas suppliers for the European market. Accord-
ing to the EUMM mandate, the monitors are not least 
instructed to observe the safety of transport links, en-
ergy infrastructure and institutions. The Nabucco pipe-
line project, for instance, is supported by the EU and 
represents the EU’s effort to make itself less dependent 
on Russian gas and oil, because nowadays, Russia sup-
plies the European countries with up to 40% of its gas. 
Russia’s involvement in Georgian conflicts has made Eu-
rope’s effort intricate to branch out its energy supplies 
away from the growing dominance of Russia that con-
trols the Caucasian corridor and caused a further de-
lay in the construction of Nabucco. Considering these 
facts, it indeed seems like the EUMM is an integral part 
of EU geopolitics, which has nothing in common with a 
neutral monitoring mission. 
 
Reform or termination 
The ideal standing behind the EUMM, a neutral moni-
toring mission that prevents violent incidents between 
two former opponents of war, is certainly useful. Yet, 
the EUMM how it currently is does not fit the ideal. The 
EUMM should be replaced by a truly, or at least more, 
neutral observer mission, organized and led by an or-
ganization that can be considered less blinded by eco-
nomic interests. Certainly, a completely neutral mission 
is illusionary, but a combination of the EU and NGOs 
could be a good solution. That way, political legitimiza-
tion, funds and impartiality are ensured. 
Yet, if the EU stays on Georgia’s side, it will have to face 
serious disputes with the Russia. Since the above men-
tioned arguments cannot be deleted by the EUMM’s 
reformation and as the EU is not known for its un-bu-
reaucratic and fast nature only the EUMM’s termination 
can be recommended. 
Moreover, the presence of the EU poses a provocation 
to Russia. In the past, Russia and EU member states had 
numerous diplomatic fights over the military presence 
of NATO, the US and the EU in Russia’s proximity. The 
planned missile defense system in Poland and the Czech 
Republic, as well as the prospect of NATO membership 
for the South Caucasus countries threatened Russia’s 
sense of security. A good step forward certainly is the fact 
that the EUMM is keeping contact with the security forc-
es of Russia. If the EU and the EUMM continue dialogues 
with Russia, they will be able to achieve their ideological 
as well as their economic goals – peace, political stability 
and the protection of energy sources. Then, the EUMM 
will be neither reluctant nor redundant. 
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Joint programme Council of Europe / European Union “Pro-
moting freedom, professionalism and pluralism of the media 
in the South Caucasus and Moldova”
ELIZABETH CADOUX
University of Tartu
Abstract
While free and independent media, sometimes qualified as the “forth estate”, is a pillar of civil society, the European Union 
(EU) is rather absent from media development in democratizing countries. In its Strategy Paper 2011-2013, the European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights does not mention the media as an explicit objective. Despite the poor 
situation of media in the South Caucasus, the EU is quite discreet in this sector of democracy promotion within the Arme-
nia, Azeri and Georgian civil societies. It co-funds with the Council of Europe the joint programme “Promoting freedom, 
professionalism and pluralism of the media in South Caucasus and Moldova”, which started on January 1, 2011 and will 
run until December 31, 2012. The implementation of the programme is entirely under the responsibility of the Council of 
Europe, an organisation which lacks the EU institutional incentives to influence the governments in the South Caucasus. 
Can the Council of Europe / European Union Joint programme SC-MLD-Media II have any impact on the media situation 
in South Caucasus, or do the realities on the field prevent any efficient implementation?
The Joint Programme 
SC-MLD-Media II:
The overall goal of the programme is to “support the 
development of legal and institutional guarantees for 
freedom of expression, higher quality journalism and 
a pluralistic media landscape in Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and Moldova in line with the Council of Eu-
rope standards and as regards both ‘traditional’ and 
‘new’ media”. This programme has a budget of €1 100 
000. The activities of the Council of Europe follow three 
main themes: 
the legal framework and its implementation (expected 
results: the regulatory framework for freedom of 
expression and for the media is brought closer in 
line with European standards; the implementation 
of the media-related regulatory framework and 
self-regulation are improved in line with Council of 
Europe standards); 
an independent and effective broadcasting (expected 
results: the broadcasting regulatory bodies are bet-
ter equipped to function in an independent and 
effective manner; the public service broadcasters 
gain in professionalism and are better trusted by 
the political leaders, the civil society, media profes-
sionals and the public at large);
and journalism curricula integrating journalist rights 
and ethic rules to promote journalism and media 
professionalism (expected results: journalists have 
better understanding of their rights, respect ethi-
cal rules and are trained to exercise their work in 
a professional and responsible manner as recom-
mended under the applicable Council of Europe 
standards; applicable Council of Europe standards; 
The quality of journalism education is improved, 
notably through introducing new courses, or en-
hancing existing ones, on the rights and responsi-
bilities of journalists).
The main interlocutor targeted by the Council of Eu-
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rope in this programme is civil society. The participants 
of the activities organized through those two years are 
journalists, unions, NGOs, media lawyers, judges, broad-
cast institutions and citizens themselves. Meanwhile of-
ficial authorities are scarcely involved in the process. Di-
alogue with them is of course not totally excluded. The 
Georgian National Communication committee, a state 
authority independent from the State budget, par-
ticipated in a workshop on the implementation of the 
Code for Broadcasters. In Armenia help from experts of 
the Council of Europe was offered for the elaboration of 
the draft amendments to the Law on Radio and Televi-
sion organised by the ombudsman. Most of the legal 
assistance is actually provided to the Moldavian author-
ities and not the South Caucasus ones despite Azerbai-
jan’s lack of media-supportive legislative framework. 
In the South Caucasus the activities of the programme 
emphasize the familiarization of journalists, judges 
and media lawyers with the Article 10 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights: “Everyone has the right 
to freedom of expression. This right shall include free-
dom to hold and to receive and impart information 
and ideas without interference by public authority and 
regardless of frontiers.” Seven specific seminars or spe-
cial trainings are dedicated to the issue. In the spirit of 
the programme it is the civil society, which should carry 
the project of reforming the legal framework and the 
political practices to the public authorities, which then 
would implement them. The effectiveness of the pro-
gramme leans on the dangerous assumption that the 
governments are willing to improve the media situa-
tion in their countries. 
Unlike the previous joint programme on media promo-
tion (running over the period 2008-2009) the objectives 
of the programme of 2011-2012 are not differentiated ac-
cording to the targeted country: the same results are ex-
pected from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova. 
The Council of Europe thus assumes that media-struc-
ture in the four countries is similar, and that the media is 
confronted by the same restrictions. A closer look at the 
media situation in each of the South Caucasus countries 
will show that this is actually short-sighted. 
Media freedom in the 
South Caucasus:
In the three South Caucasian Republics, media outlets 
are struggling for their independence, their freedom 
of expression and the right to information. Both the 
Armenian media and the Azeri media are qualified as 
‘not free’ by Freedom House, respectively with a score 
of 6 and 6,75 respectively. Only in Georgia is the media 
partly free with a score of 4,25. 
Georgia. Freedom of speech and freedom of expres-
sion are both basically secured by the Georgian legal 
framework. Libel is no longer a criminal offence. Laws 
on freedom of expressions and access to information 
are broadly meeting international standards, but they 
are not enforced because of a lack of political will. The 
government tries to control opposition media, and cre-
ates impediments to the access to information. The 
main problem pointed out by international watchdog 
organisations is the lack of transparency in media own-
ership and property rights, especially for television. The 
Law on Broadcasting was amended in April 2011 by 
the Parliament to ban broadcast media ownership by 
offshore registered firms; positive effects to comment 
upon are yet to come. Moreover the media is struggling 
to achieve economic independence. The main nation-
wide television stations are owned by big businesses 
close to the state. Internet is not subject to government 
regulations, but the journalists’ limited knowledge con-
cerning Internet technologies and web-tools prevent 
them from taking advantage of this space of liberty. Be-
sides Internet penetration is quite low, especially out-
side of the main cities. 
Armenia. Armenian media is working in an oppressive 
environment; opposition media is subject to pressure 
and harassment. In 2003  law on freedom of information 
was adopted but not implemented. In June 2010 the 
Law on Television and Radio consolidated the control 
of the government over broadcast media – the media 
with the broader audience. Self-censorship is common. 
Advertising resources are quite narrow, and thus can-
not guarantee economic independence. In May 2010 
the penal code was amended and defamation is no 
longer punishable by imprisonment. This positive trend 
is overshadowed by the multiplication of trials for defa-
mation, followed by exorbitant fines which put some 
journalists and some media outlets in serious financial 
difficulties. As in Georgia, the Internet is relatively free 
but with low penetration. 
Azerbaijan. Imprisonment, violence and harassment 
are commonly used against journalists and bloggers 
expressing dissident opinions in Azerbaijan. There is 
no media pluralism. Print outlets are owned by gov-
ernment officials or the ruling party; broadcast media 
is almost entirely controlled by the government. The 
legal background does not secure any rights for the 
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journalists. The criminal offence of libel is regularly used 
to silence opposition journalists. Despite the ban of of-
ficial censorship in 1998, the practice is still well-spread. 
Azerbaijan is the only South Caucasus regime control-
ling on-line media. 
What e#ciency of the promotion 
of freedom of media by the 
Council of Europe in the 
South Caucasus?
Despite undifferentiated objectives in its narrative, the 
Council of Europe has attempted to take into accounts 
the local specificities of each country when drawing up 
the programme activities, in order to meet handle the 
concrete realities of the field with accuracy. Enrolling 
local experts in the programme allows the European 
consultants to better understand the local needs. In 
Armenia a TV programme was broadcast in September 
2011 to raise the judges’ awareness on the application 
of libel and defamation legislation as well as on its con-
sequences for the journalists. 
Unlike what the Council of Europe assumed in the pro-
gramme narrative, public authorities are not ready to 
ease their pressure on the media, and their cooperation 
is scarce. Instead the Council of Europe favours cooper-
ation with civil society and local actors in an attempt to 
trigger grass-roots movements defending media rights 
and which would in turn pressure the governments. In-
dividuals are key targets in this strategy, because they 
can be actively involved in media promotion by report-
ing as often as possible violations to the freedom of ex-
pression and violations to their right to information. To 
avoid inefficient state institutions, the Council of Europe 
works with independent bodies which are less sensitive 
to state influence. It is the case in Armenia, where the 
use of the Media Ethics Observatory is favoured over 
the one of the classical judiciary system. Working exclu-
sively with civil society and avoiding contact with the 
official authorities could be to some extent efficient in 
Armenia and Georgia since a basic legal framework is 
already settled there. But it cannot have any impact in 
Azerbaijan given the degree of governmental oppres-
sion over there. Overall in the three countries coopera-
tion with or pressure on the official authorities to influ-
ence the legislation making and its implementation is 
still needed. Failing to secure it is a crucial shortcom-
ing in the programme of the Council of Europe. The 
Council of Europe’s institutional weakness could be 
overcome if the joint programme were completed by 
EU actions at the governmental level through the Euro-
pean Neighourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership. 
However,  EU strategies of democracy promotion have 
focused on state institutions and have left out civil soci-
ety and media. Moreover, EU democracy promotion in 
the region has been slowed down by strategic interests 
such as energy transport and production. 
The second drawback in the programme is the absence 
of attention dedicated to the economic viability of me-
dia outlets. Indeed the media is not only threatened by 
political practices but also by impediments to achiev-
ing economic and financial independence. Broadcast 
and print media rely heavily on the advertisement mar-
ket, and can easily be overtaken by big government-
friendly businesses. Despite the decriminalisation of 
libel, Armenian media has been facing the additional 
difficulty of defamation fines, which can push it to-
wards close-downs. Available resources are not the only 
side of the economic issue. Journalists also need to be 
trained in business management in order to keep their 
outlet viable by themselves. But the curricula praised by 
the Council of Europe focused exclusively on ethics and 
rights of journalists and leaves out the economic aspect 
of the journalistic training. 
Finally, the programme focuses too much on the tradi-
tional media. Since in Armenia and in Georgia the Inter-
net is not yet under control, web-training should be given 
more importance in the journalistic curricula. Then the 
media would have the tools necessary to create on the 
Internet the space of liberty and of information-exchange 
that is absent within traditional media outlets. Besides, 
economic viability is easier to achieve for web-sites than 
for printed newspapers. The Internet penetration is still 
quite low today, but it has been gradually growing. Jour-
nalists should makes the best of the freedom they have 
now to prevent inevitably looming government control. 
The focus of the Council of Europe is too much on theo-
retical issues: its programme is about raising awareness 
on freedom of expression and on the right to infor-
mation as well as on the importance of free and inde-
pendent media in a democratic civil society. However, 
it does not give the journalists the tools to create this 
independent, pluralistic and professional media sector 
because it lets aside the technical issues of economic 
and web training. Moreover, the “joint” aspect of the 
programme should not be limited to the sharing of 
funds with the EU, so that the reputation of the EU con-
tributes to the effectiveness of the programme.
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The EU-Russia partnership:
a new context
NADIA ALEXANDROVA-ARBATOVA
Russian Academy of Sciences.
Abstract
The EU–Russia summit that took place on June 4 in St Petersburg met expectations for two reasons. Firstly, expectations 
prior to the summit were low: nobody was under any illusion that the summit would result in a radical breakthrough. 
Secondly, the biannual EU–Russia summits tend to produce symbolic rather than practical outcomes.
This article was originally published in English by FRIDE in July 2012
http://www.fride.org/publication/1038/the-eu-russia-partnership:-a-new-context
The June EU-Russia summit: 
no surprises
The first EU–Russia summit since Vladimir Putin’s return 
to the Russian presidency was supposed to display 
harmony between the two sides, rather than exposing 
their differences. The official message from the sum-
mit states that the relationship between Moscow and 
Brussels is strong, with the potential for even greater 
improvement in the future. The EU acted wisely by ini-
tiating a dialogue with the newly-elected Russian presi-
dent. Brussels clearly recognises Russia’s importance as 
a strategic partner, and wants to build on the ‘signifi-
cant progress on a number of issues’ that the EU–Russia 
relationship has made in recent years. The same can be 
said of Putin himself, who confirmed the strategic na-
ture of Russia–EU relations, stating that the EU’s impor-
tance to Russia was second only to the Eurasian Union.
Putin and his guests from Brussels gave controversial 
issues a wide berth: the situation in Syria was only men-
tioned briefly, with both sides verbally rejecting the use 
of force. There was no talk of the controversial Ballistic 
Missile Defence system planned for Europe or of Rus-
sia’s ban on EU meat. The ballot fraud at Russia’s recent 
presidential and parliamentary elections was also off 
the agenda. However, the summit did touch on issues 
which have been hampering efforts to forge a new 
broad-based cooperation agreement after four years of 
talks, including energy supplies, trade and market ac-
cess, a visa-free travel regime and human rights. None 
of these differences was solved at the summit. Its main 
achievement was to demonstrate the readiness of both 
sides to continue the EU-Russia dialogue – however 
difficult it may be.
With Putin’s return to presidency, political analysts both 
in Russia and abroad are trying to predict whether 
there will be fundamental changes or continuity in Rus-
sia’s foreign policy. Generally speaking, radical foreign 
policy changes in a given country occur only as a result 
of radical external or internal changes (such as the col-
lapse of the USSR). With a routine leadership change, it 
is usually new overtones and emphases that define a 
new foreign policy course. Although many experts say 
that the ‘new’ Putin won’t be any different from the ‘old’ 
one, complete continuity is impossible since he has 
come to power in a markedly different domestic and 
foreign policy situation.
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The new context of EU-Russia relations
Both Russia and Europe are experiencing important 
political, economic and social transformations with 
strong implications fortheir relationship. In the wake 
of the 2008 financial crisis, it dawned on the Russian 
population that having a modern economy meant be-
ing part of the modern world which in Russia’s case 
largely comprises the EU (as its main trading part-
ner), the US, Japan and South Korea. The realignment 
of Russia’s relations with the US, the EU, Norway and 
Ukraine was a reflection of this new understanding. 
President Dmitry Medvedev launched the strategy un-
der the title ‘Partnership for Modernisation’, which was 
then endorsed by a joint Russia–EU declaration. The 
imperative to modernise was creating a new model 
for Russian relations with the European Union and the 
West at large, although from the outset there was no 
consensus among the Russian political elite on what 
exactly modernization entailed.
As Putin returns to presidency he faces a very differ-
ent Europe. The ongoing eurozone crisis has already 
resulted in damage to the EU’s reputation as a model 
of both competent economic policy management and 
successful regional integration and multilateral coop-
eration. As a result of the crisis and intense competition 
from emerging powers, the EU’s values-based foreign 
policy is being replaced by economisation, re- nation-
alisation and bilateralisation. EU member states are 
competing for economic deals with Russia and China. 
In short, the crisis has dealt a heavy blow to the attrac-
tiveness of the EU soft power model for third countries 
– including Russia.
It is not just Europe that has changed, however: Putin 
is also confronted with a new Russia. In 2000 he was 
required to reinstate stability after years of chaos and 
humiliation. Now the situation is different. Although 
nobody doubted in Putin’s electoral victory, there was 
strong opposition to his return. Protests have been trig-
gered by the September decision of the duumvirate of 
Putin and Medvedev to swap seats and the electoral 
fraud in December. Nonetheless, they should be viewed 
in the broader context of Russia’s post-Communist evo-
lution, which has entered a new phase. The collapse 
of the USSR resulted in market economy reforms (with 
admittedly mixed results), but no steps were taken to 
create a solid foundation for Russia’s political democra-
tisation. In 2012, a proportion of the Russian population 
does not want just stability, but also seeks democratic 
political reforms. The existing politico-economic sys-
tem can no longer adequately address growing social 
demands. The system must change if Russia is to de-
velop further. Without political reform this will not be 
possible and popular protests will persist.
When he came to power in 2000, Putin hoped to 
improve Russia’s global prestige not on the basis of 
unilateral concessions as Yeltsin had, but on an equal 
footing with other key powers. His expectations were 
disappointed by the West after 9/11. Russia has yet 
to find its proper place in post-bipolar Europe, partly 
due to its own mistakes but largely because of the 
short-sighted policies of its Western partners. Now 
Putin has no illusions about the integration of Russia 
with the West. He wants Russia to remain a sovereign 
centre of power, with its area ofprimaryinfluence-
basedontheEurasian Union (virtual though it is for 
the time being). At the St Petersburg summit, Putin 
stated that the Eurasian Union would play an increas-
ingly important role on the global stage, adding that 
the EU would have to deal with the Eurasian Union’s 
commission along with Moscow. The Eurasian Union 
is undoubtedly an important new dimension of Rus-
sia’s foreign policy.
The focus on Russia’s Eurasian vocation comes at a 
time of uncertainty concerning the country’s prospects 
for modernisation. In all likelihood, Putin feels that Rus-
sia should no longer solicit modernisation guidance 
from the weakened EU. From his point of view, Euro-
peans are in no position to lecture other countries on 
good governance and democracy. According to Putin, 
now is the time to devise an efficient mechanism for 
upgrading the national economy by launching a New 
Industrialisation plan based on sophisticated technolo-
gies. It is not yet apparent how this will be synchronised 
with the Partnership for Modernisation nor where Rus-
sia could obtain the advertised ‘sophisticated technolo-
gies’ for its re- industralisation. Is ‘New Industrialisation’ 
simply a catchy term for modernisation without the 
democratisation issues? As former Russian Prime Min-
ister Yevgeny Primakov explained, a modernisation 
strategy doesn’t imply mere adoption of western coun-
tries’ achievements. Russia is not yet ready to become 
a post-industrial society, renouncing industrial produc-
tion in favour of science and services. Instead of leaping 
straight into a post-industrial state, Russia must follow 
the ‘re-industrialisation’ strategy that Putin is offering. 
Primakov stressed that Russia should adopt not only 
western technological and scientific achievements, but 
also the breakthroughs and positive trends of Soviet 
science that have been unjustly forgotten.
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Russia’s domestic discourse 
on the Euro crisis
Russia’s domestic debate over the EU crisis is key to under-
standing the future of EU– Russia relations. There is an ideo-
logical divide within Russia’s academic and political commu-
nity between ‘Modernisers’ and ‘Eurasianists’. The latter say 
that the current EU crisis is the best evidence of the move-
ment of the centre of economic activity to Asia, and that 
the Western model of sustainable economic development 
has already exhausted its resources. Therefore Russia should 
follow its own path, based around the Eurasian Union. The 
idea is not new. Russia has been debating its national iden-
tity for the past 200 years; embroiled in endless arguments 
over whether Russians are Europeans or Eurasians. The doc-
trine of ‘Eurasianism’ places geographical location above the 
basic principles of a country’s socio-economic and political 
development. The Eurasian camp consists of three political 
forces: Communists, Nationalists and Conservatives (includ-
ing neo-cons and mere opportunists). Communists sup-
port a Russian union with China and the so-called Chinese 
model for Russia’s transformation. Nationalists are opposed 
to this union as they believe that China would be the domi-
nant partner. They want Russia to be a sovereign Eurasian 
centre of power and reap all the benefits of this position. 
Conservatives fear the demise of the EU and the collapse 
of the eurozone, as they have many business interests in EU 
countries and 40 per cent of Russia’s foreign reserves are in 
euro. However, they are firmly against Russia’s European vo-
cation, which presents a threat to the existing system. They 
want to keep European powers divided and extract benefits 
from bilateral relations.
Modernisers are against Russia’s Eurasian vocation, maintain-
ing that it would not work anyway. Integration between au-
thoritarian states is not possible, as such regimes would not 
concede their sovereignty. For them, the Chinese model is 
not an option for Russia, because it revolves around the tran-
sition from an agricultural society to an industrial state. The 
USSR missed this opportunity in the late 1920s.
The Modernisers’ camp is also split into pro-US and pro-EU 
factions. The former – most vividly represented by /free mar-
ket economists close to Jeffrey Sachs – attributes the euro cri-
sis to the social and economic model of EU countries, which 
would be too ‘socialist’ for the globalised economy. Such a 
view prioritises economic models and neglects the political 
aspects of European integration. The pro-EU community is 
not blind to the depth of the euro crisis, and recognises that 
it is systemic. The most compelling indications of the ongo-
ing crisis include the growing mistrust between Brussels and 
ordinary EU citizens, an increasing divide between northern 
and southern EU countries, and the rising tide of national-
ism, the challenges to the multicultural project in Germany, 
France and the UK, and xenophobia and populism in EU 
member states. In this context, the fundamental issue is 
not simply whether the Eurozone survives, but whether the 
core concepts of the European integration will remain viable. 
However, they believe that the EU will come out of this crisis 
stronger and reinstate its position.
Economists from both camps recognise that the euro crisis 
could affect Russia in many ways. A decline in prices for oil 
and metal exports will hit the Russian economy hard. If the 
crisis continues, investors will start to sell not only European 
financial assets, but risk-prone assets from all over the world 
– including Russia. A further escalation of the euro crisis may 
trigger external shocks, which will affect the activity of Rus-
sian credit organisations.
Conclusion
EU-Russia relations are losing their sense of purpose. Both 
sides are confronted with serious problems; the question 
is whether their cooperation can advance in this context. 
Despite their considerable domestic challenges, the medi-
um-term goals of both Russian and EU foreign policies are 
the same: predominance of pragmatic economic interests 
over political or ideological differences, emphasis on bilat-
eral relations and status-(re)building. The guiding principles 
of Russia’s foreign policy under Putin’s will be quid pro quo, 
linking Russian political and military concessions to Western 
economic concessions. If President Putin clearly understands 
what Russia can gain from a particular deal, he will be a reli-
able
partner. Piecemeal cooperation will not put EU–Russia rela-
tions on a new footing. A future paradigm shift would be 
contingent on the EU surviving the crisis, proving the viabil-
ity of its model and defining a clear strategy vis-à-vis Russia, 
based on a careful balance between its values and realistic 
objectives.
However, the EU has a trump card up its sleeve – the visa-
free regime. Achieving that would be a diplomatic coup 
for Putin, raising his popularity among the Russian middle 
class. The critical importance of this issue is generally misun-
derstood in the West. For centuries, contacts with the West 
were limited to Russian aristocracy and then to Soviet no-
menklatura. After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the physi-
cal barrier from the East was removed but replaced by the 
visa ‘barrier’ from the West. If a visa-free regime is granted, it 
will not be a concession to Putin, but rather an important 
factor to strengthen people-to-people contacts, to provide 
a basis for a new partnership and to enhance Russian self-
identification as a European nation.
